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Abstract  
 
Research on civil war mobilization emphasizes armed group recruitment tactics and individual 
motivations to fight, but does not explore how individuals come to perceive the threat involved in 
civil war. Drawing on eight months of fieldwork with participants and nonparticipants in the 
Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992±93, this article argues that social structures, within which 
individuals are embedded, provide access to information critical for mobilization decisions by 
collectively framing threat. Threat framing filters from national through local leadership, to be 
consolidated and acted on within quotidian networks. Depending on how the threat is perceived²
whether toward the self or the collectivity at its different levels²individuals adopt self- to other-
regarding roles, from fleeing to fighting on behalf of the collectivity, even if it is a weaker actor in 
the war. This analysis sheds light on how the social framing of threat shapes mobilization 
trajectories and how normative and instrumental motivations interact in civil war. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why do some individuals engage in high-risk mobilization, while others escape the fighting 
in the conditions of imminent threat against their group? The question of mobilization has occupied 
a prominent place in the civil war literature. Scholars have analyzed individual motivations for 
participation and recruitment strategies employed by armed groups1 to motivate participation²the 
dual dynamics of mobilization.2 Studies have demonstrated the roles of collective grievances (Gurr 
1970; Horowitz 1985), selective incentives and social sanctions (Weinstein 2007; Humphreys and 
Weinstein 2008), social networks and norms (Petersen 2001; Staniland 2012; Parkinson 2013), 
emotions, identities, and ideological commitments (Wood 2003; Viterna 2013; Gutiérrez and Wood 
2014), and security-seeking drives (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). These determinants 
have been shown to variously affect individual paths to participation (Viterna 2013), or roles (Peter-
sen 2001; Parkinson 2013) adopted by individuals at different stages of conflict (Gates 2002) and 
across different types of armed groups (Gutiérrez and Giustozzi 2010). 
Yet mobilization decisions depend not only on individual motivations for participation and 
armed group recruitment tactics, but also on the ways in which individuals come to perceive threat 
involved in civil war. Without an understanding of who is threatened, by whom, and to what extent, 
individuals have no basis to make difficult choices about whether to risk their lives fighting for the 
group or pursue alternative options, such as defection or flight. How threat perceptions emerge and 
influence individual mobilization decisions, however, has not been explored in current research on 
civil war. This leaves unanswered critical questions about mobilization: Where do individuals seek 
information on threat? Who provides such information? How does it affect mobilization decisions? 
                                                 
1
 This applies to both insurgent and incumbent forces.  
2
 On the dual structure of mobilization, see Eck (2010). See Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) for a review of the 
literature on individual motivations and Blattman and Miguel (2010) on recruitment.  
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Drawing on the case of Abkhaz mobilization at the beginning of the Georgian-Abkhaz war 
(August 14-18, 1992), this article argues that actors across social structures, within which potential 
participants3 are embedded, collectively frame threat posed by civil war and shape individual threat 
perceptions and mobilization decisions. In the context of mass confusion surrounding the first days 
of the war in Abkhazia, collective threat framing was central to Abkhaz mobilization. Abkhaz men 
and women relied on the familiar social structures of family, friendship, local relation, and national 
authority for essential information on how to understand threat presented by the war and how to act 
in response across a range of combatant, support, and non-fighter roles that existed at the war onset.  
7KHLQIRUPDWLRQILOWHUHGIURP$ENKD]LD¶VQDWLRQDOOHDGHUVWKURXJKUHVSHFWHGPHPEHUVRI
local communities, to be reinforced and acted upon within the quotidian networks of relatives and 
friends. Invoking shared understandings of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, these actors produced a 
MRLQWYLHZRIWKH*HRUJLDQDUPHGIRUFHVDVWKUHDWHQLQJ$ENKD]LD¶VDXWRnomy and the Abkhaz as a 
group. The emergence of collective threat framing affected how Abkhaz men and women perceived 
threat²as directed toward the self or the group²and their mobilization decisions, from individual 
attempts to flee or defect to collective mobilization to fight on the weaker, Abkhaz side in the war.  
By tracing the process of collective threat framing at the onset of Abkhaz war mobilization, 
this article highlights the variable and socially constructed nature of threat perceptions in civil war. 
It demonstrates how shared conceptions of threat emerge and what role social structures play in this 
process. The argument centers on a simple but overlooked function of social structures in the midst 
of uncertainty inherent in civil war, to provide access to and consolidate information based on pre-
existing notions of conflict. Individual instrumental and normative motives for mobilization and 
self- to other-regarding mobilization decisions are situated in this embedded social context. 
                                                 
3
 I focus on fighters and define potential participants as all individuals in the mobilization pool who are able to fight.  
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The following sections, first, present the puzzle of Abkhaz mobilization and the contribu-
tions of this study. I then turn to my research design and develop the argument on collective threat 
framing by looking closely at the Abkhaz case. The article concludes with the implications of this 
analysis for research on social mobilization. 
THE PUZZLE OF ABKHAZ MOBILIZATION 
 Mobilization by ordinary people in the face of severe state repression and physical harm in 
fighting, often against superior state and non-state forces, has been widely recorded in the civil war 
studies.4 The puzzle of high-risk mobilization is reflected in the Abkhaz case²a case of immediate 
mass mobilization for war against a stronger opponent. Today a breakaway territory of Georgia, the 
conflict in Abkhazia evolved over the Soviet period.5 While Abkhazia enjoyed the Soviet Socialist 
Republic status in the opening decade of the Union, it was formally incorporated into Georgia as an 
Autonomous Republic in 1931. Repression of the Abkhaz in the political, economic, and cultural 
realms and mass Georgian resettlement followed the 1931 status change. The process dramatically 
altered the demographic composition of Abkhazia and the Georgian-Abkhaz tensions in Abkhazia 
intensified as a result. The Abkhaz elite appealed to the Soviet center in Moscow in an attempt to 
restore WKHUHJLRQ¶V rights. Public protests were periodic (1931, 1957, 1965, 1967, 1978, 1988, and 
1989), culminating in violent clashes in the late 1980s²the last to be dispersed by disintegrating 
Soviet troops²and the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-1993. 
Existing models poorly predict PRELOL]DWLRQLQWKLVFDVH³RQH would have predicted a .13 
probability that a group ZLWKWKHVWUXFWXUDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV« of the Abkhaz would have engaged in 
                                                 
4
 These risks exist in defensive and offensive mobilization (Petersen 2001; Wood 2003; Humphreys and Weinstein 
2008; Parkinson 2013). 
5
 Scholars have identified historical (Anchabadze 1998; Lakoba 2004; Papaskiri 2010), political (Coppieters 1996; 
Cornell 2000; Nodia and Scholtbach 2006), economic (Zürcher et al. 2005), social (Hewitt 1996; Derluguian 2005), 
and external (Baev 1997; Lynch 2000) roots of the conflict. 
4 
 
VHSDUDWLVWPRELOL]DWLRQ´%HLVVLQJHU7KH$ENKD]VLGHZDVDWDVLJQLILFDQWGLVDGYDQWDJH 
in manpower and arms at the war onset. Demographically, 93,000 Abkhaz had little chance against 
240,000 Georgians from Abkhazia and five-million-strong Georgia.6 Militarily, Georgia inherited 
most Soviet weapons in the Caucasus (15 May, 1992, Tashkent Agreement), while the Abkhaz did 
not have a comparable access to arms (Zverev 1996).7 :LWKWKLVFDSDFLW\*HRUJLD¶V forces entered 
Abkhazia through the administrative border in the east on August 14, 1992, and advanced from the 
Black Sea in the west the following night, effectively encircling the territory in the span of a day. 
The capacity of the Georgian forces was evident earlier in July, 1989, when Georgians from 
Abkhazia and Georgia clashed with the Abkhaz in the capital Sukhum/i.8 Only Soviet troops were 
able to stop the violence and many Abkhaz participants were repressed (Hewitt 1996). Despite this 
SUHFHGHQWWKH$ENKD]GLGQRWH[SHFWDZDUDQGPHW*HRUJLD¶VDGYDQFHXQSUHSDUHG,Q'HFHPEHU
1991, Abkhaz leaders formed the Special Regiment of Internal Forces (SRIF) of Abkhazia on the 
basis of the so-called 8th Regiment of the Soviet $UP\WKDWGLVSHUVHGYLROHQFHSULRUWRWKH8QLRQ¶V
collapse. Within a year, the SRIF had 1,000 fighters, including 100 regulars equipped with arms and 
uniforms and stationed across Abkhazia. However, most reservists were dismissed before the war.9 
Moreover, mandatory registration and collection of weapons from the population preceded it.10 
Greatly outnumbered, poorly armed, and surprised by the Georgian advance into Abkhazia, 
at least 13%11 of the Abkhaz population mobilized to fight on the Abkhaz side²a substantial share 
                                                 
6
 According to the 1989 census, the Georgian population comprised 45.7% of Abkhazia in contrast to 17.8% Abkhaz. 
On the demographic situation in Abkhazia more broadly, see Trier et al. (2010). 
7
 On the Georgian forces, see also Darchiashvili (1997), Zürcher et al. (2005), Driscoll (2009). 
8
 I use the combined Georgian and Abkhaz spelling of proper nouns as written in English.  
9
 For example, only six reservists guarded the Okhurej post by the administrative border with Georgia on August 14 
(Pachulija 2010, 29). 
10
 See Resolution of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia of 20 January, 1992 (Diasamidze 2002, 14). 
11
 The figure is based on the number of casualties on the Abkhaz side in the war. For the population of 93,000 Abkhaz, 
HRW (1995, 5) records over 4,000 deaths and 8,000 injuries. For a discussion, see Yamskov (2009). At the war onset, 
Baev (2003, 138) estimates 1,000 Abkhaz fighters, but this figure focuses on city defense and does not include 
mobilization in eastern and western villages. 
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compared to other civil wars of the time (Lacina 2006, 279). Two fighter trajectories emerged at the 
war onset. Regular soldiers and reservists formally recruited into the SRIF prior to the war adopted 
what I call an organized fighter trajectory. Most mobilization was not through formal recruitment. 
Ordinary Abkhaz mobilized voluntarily in a spontaneous trajectory.12 Beyond this male dominated 
fighter body, men and women with medical, engineering, and logistical skills engaged in support. 
As an Abkhaz commander describes the Abkhaz force, ³)LJKWHUVI>RX@JKWHYHU\RQHHOVHKHOS>HG@´
following a commonly gendered pattern of civil war participation (Interview 127, Sukhum/i, Winter 
2011; Parkinson 2013). Yet others who were able to fight took a non-fighter trajectory and escaped 
the fighting by hiding, fleeing, or, in rare cases, defecting to the Georgian side. The analysis of the 
processes leading to these divergent mobilization trajectories can help understand why some²but 
not all²individuals assume incredible risks mobilizing to fight for their group when alternative 
options are available. 
SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND MOBILIZATION 
 The significance of social structures for civil war mobilization has been widely recognized. 
Social structures help recruit participants (Aspinall 2009; Fujii 2009), generate pressure to mobilize 
by sanctioning non-participants and rewarding participants (Petersen 2001; Weinstein 2007), shape 
the nature of war-time organizations as they form and adapt to new circumstances (Staniland 2012; 
Parkinson 2013), and transform in the course of war so as to produce new forms of organization in 
society (Wood 2008). By placing the complex processes of individual decision-making in civil war 
in their socio-structural context through an in-depth, local-level analysis of mobilization in the case 
of Abkhazia, this article makes three contributions to the study of social mobilization. 
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 Fighters in the two trajectories were merged in the Abkhaz army formed in the course of the war.  
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 Theoretically, this article broadens the scope of analysis from a recent organizational focus 
to include micro- and macro-level social structures of quotidian family and friendship and national 
authority respectively (Staniland 2012; Parkinson 2013). This theoretical move is motivated by the 
observation that individuals whose social networks do not overlap with the formal organizations of 
rebellion mobilize for violence (Aspinall 2009; Fujii 2009). The extended focus on quotidian, local, 
and national structures allows me to gauge how information is transmitted across society to impact 
socially embedded actors. The filtering of information through society is an innovative addition to 
social mechanisms that drive individuals into participation (Petersen 2001; Weinstein 2007). 
 In assessing the impact of social structures on mobilization, this article shifts attention from 
the nature of ties that bind individuals to their content. The strength of ties is central to the diffusion 
and consolidation of information in society, but it is shared understandings of history and identity 
underlying social structures that shape mobilization decisions (Granovetter 1973). Informed by 
constructivist theories of identity, this article shows that social structures enable mobilization when 
information that they transmit relates individual actions as part of the group to shared experiences of 
conflict, that is, to a relevant collective identity (Gould 1995; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Wood 2003; 
Viterna 2013). Attention to shared notions of conflict helps me link distinct collective identities to 
self- to other-regarding individual actions. The coexistence of instrumental and normative bases for 
these actions is an important insight for theories of individual motivations in civil war (Kalyvas 
2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Gutiérrez and Wood 2014).  
 Methodologically, this article adds to the growing scholarship based on immersive study of 
mobilization (Wood 2003; Aspinall 2009; Fujii 2009; Parkinson 2013; Viterna 2013). The detailed 
individual-level data contextualized with archival and secondary materials, which resulted from my 
field-intensive research on mobilization in Abkhazia, allows me to identify individual mobilization 
trajectories and situate them in their broader social and historical environment. This data advances 
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approaches to mobilization from the view of actors as isolated from the social context and driven to 
civil war participation by stable preferences and cost-benefit calculations to insight on how socially 
embedded actors come to perceive and act upon the dilemmas of civil war. The approach to complex 
individual choices as informed by their socio-structural position contributes to the difficult field of 
individual decision-making in civil war (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Wood 2015).  
 Empirically, this article brings an understudied case of Abkhaz mobilization to the tradition 
of scholarship on high-risk, violent mobilization in contexts of deep social conflict. Mobilization in 
these conditions spans, for example, Lithuania in the Soviet period (Petersen 2001), El Salvador in 
the 1970s-1980s (Wood 2003), Lebanon in the 1980s (Parkinson 2013), Sierra Leone in the 1990s 
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), and most recently Ukraine (Beissinger 2013). The Abkhaz case 
is an important addition to this scholarship. A case of deeply integrated pre-war society, reflected 
in high levels of inter-group interaction in family, neighborhoods, education, and employment, this 
case has implications for the study of violence in diverse societies (Straus 2006; Fujii 2009; Varsh-
ney 2002; Habyarimana et al. 2009). It illuminates the processes of formation of conflict identities, 
escalation of inter-group violence, and effect of different social relations on war-time mobilization. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 Capturing the underlying processes of civil war mobilization²³what kinds of noncivil war 
contention they FRPHIURPDQGKRZWKH\HYROYHLQWHUQDOO\´²requires a grounded research design, 
based on sustained, face-to-face interaction with the actors involved in mobilization (Tarrow 2007, 
592). Immersion in the field allows researchers to develop the trust and knowledge needed to access 
and evaluate sensitive mobilization data in politicized civil war environments, inaccessible through 
formal interview or survey methods. In-depth interviews and participant observation shift attention 
from macro-structural factors to individual paths as they are situated in broader social and organiza-
tional contexts (Schatz 2009, 11; Parkinson 2013, 420; Viterna 2013). Combined with archival and 
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secondary sources, this data collection strategy provides access to beliefs and meanings individuals 
attribute to their present conditions and past experiences and helps researchers understand how the 
present influences responses about the past (Wood 2007, 127; Fujii 2010, 231; Wedeen 2010).  
 To explore the internal processes of mobilization, this article draws on eight months of field 
research carried out primarily in Abkhazia, but also in Georgia and Russia between 2010 and 2013.  
Focusing on the single, understudied Abkhaz case13 allows me to leverage the variation in localized 
context and individual trajectories of mobilization, while holding constant macro-structural factors 
identified in the cross-national literature on civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004). These factors include a shared geography characterized by mountainous terrain and absence 
of lootable resources, similar levels of political, economic, and social development²a legacy of the 
Soviet past,²and comparable urbanization and ethnic composition14 across Abkhazia. Controlling 
for these factors eliminates a number of competing macro-structural explanations and permits unit 
disaggregation and comparison within the case (Chenoweth and Lawrence 2010; Snyder 2013, 35).  
I select two sites of Abkhaz mobilization marked by local-level differences at the war onset 
that could have produced distinct processes of mobilization. Since the Georgian advance proceeded 
to surround Abkhazia from the east and west of the territory, I compare Abkhaz mobilization along 
the main road taken by the Georgian forces from $ENKD]LD¶VHDVWHUQERUGHUWRWKHFDSLWDO6XNKXPL
and the route of the Georgian advance from the sea to the major western city, Gagra. Initial Abkhaz 
mobilization concentrated in these two areas, with individuals located in central Abkhazia joining 
one or the other site of mobilization. These sites were marked by spatial differences at the war onset 
(see Figure 1 below). Proximity to the Russian border, where individuals could escape with relative  
                                                 
13
 While the case has drawn substantial scholarly attention (see fn. 5 above), analysis has often been based on elite 
interviews or data gathered outside of Abkhazia.  
14
 The Abkhaz comprised a smaller share of the population relative to Georgians in five of the seven regions of 
Abkhazia, with the eastern region of Gal/i almost entirely Georgian (Trier et al. 2010). 
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Figure 1. Spatial and Temporal Variation at the Georgian-Abkhaz War Onset 
 
Source: Based on UN map of Georgia, August 2004 
 
ease and outside help could come from, and Gudauta military base, where weapons could be sought 
in western Abkhazia, contrasted with the east, where the border with Georgia facilitated immediate 
establishment of Georgian control and blockade of the area. The sites varied not only spatially, but 
also temporally, as the Georgian advance in the west took place a day later than that in the east. The 
sources of spatial and temporal within-case variation allow me to probe how differently positioned 
individuals learned about the Georgian advance, what shaped their understanding of the situation 
across space and time, and how different social structures, with which individuals interacted on a 
regular basis before the war, affected their fighter and non-fighter trajectories when the war began. 
The analysis of the processes underlying the mobilization trajectories in eastern and western 
Abkhazia is based on 150 semi-structured interviews with 142 participants and non-participants in 
Georgian advance  
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Abkhaz control 
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14 August 
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mobilization and additional primary and secondary materials.15 To capture local-level differences 
in the selected mobilization sites and ensure representation across the mobilization trajectories, the 
interviews were conducted in four locales across three of the seven regions of Abkhazia (see Figure 
1 above).16 The interviews in Sukhum/i H[DPLQHGPRELOL]DWLRQIURP$ENKD]LD¶VHDVWHUQERUGHUWR
the capital. Secondary materials on eastern mobilization were collected on Tqvarchel/i and Gal/i²
the former immediately blockaded by Georgia, the latter predominantly populated by Georgians. I 
explored mobilization in the west in Gagra, Pitsunda, and Gudauta. The Abkhaz from these locales 
mobilized in response to the Georgian advance from the sea, with Gagra soon captured by Georgia, 
while the tourist town of Pitsunda and the military base in Gudauta remained under Abkhaz control. 
In each of these locales, I sought individuals recruited prior to the war, those who mobilized 
spontaneously, and those who did not fight. My decision to stay unaffiliated during field research17 
and long-term, engaged presence in the locales facilitated interviews, as I gained trust and access to 
respondents from multiple networks of local residents, authorities, and non-governmental staff and 
was able to avoid institutional and personal referral biases (Fujii 2008, 576). Specifically, I devised 
a private snowball sampling strategy, whereby I selected those contacts from my multiple network 
referrals who fit my research purposes (Cohen and Arieli 2011). When referrals did not provide the 
needed respondent categories, I made appointments or approached respondents in these categories, 
depending on whether it was acceptable, at their location of employment. This strategy was critical 
to increasing the representativeness of respondents (see Table 1 below). 
My interviews followed a semi-structured format, starting with a detailed informed consent 
procedure and moving through the pre-war, civil war, and post-war life histories. The major part of  
                                                 
15
 See Online Appendix for the detailed discussion of my fieldwork procedures and data analysis. 
16
 The regions include Gagra, Gudauta, Sukhum/i, Gulripsh/i, Ochamchira, Tqvarchel/i, and Gal/i. 
17
 Government or non-governmental affiliation raises suspicion in the politicized Abkhaz context. 
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Table 1. Summary of Interview Data 
   Total Percentage 
(rounded) 
 
G
en
er
al
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
 
Gender  
Male  99 70% 
Female  43 30% 
 
Self-identified 
Abkhaz  127 90% 
Other 15 10% 
 
Age 
<50 72 51% 
>50 70 49% 
 
Location  
Eastern mobilization  45 32% 
           Sukhum/i 45 32% 
Western mobilization 97 68% 
           Gagra 42 28% 
           Pitsunda 36 26% 
           Gudauta 19 14% 
 
Pr
e-
w
ar
 
 
Occupation  
State 29 20% 
Non-state 113 80% 
 
Mobilization  
Organized 45 32% 
Spontaneous  43 30% 
None  54 38% 
 
W
ar
-
tim
e 
m
o
bi
liz
at
io
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fighters 
Organized 14 10% 
           Combat 13 9% 
                   Male 13 9% 
                   Female - - 
           Support 1 1% 
                   Male 1 1% 
                   Female - - 
Spontaneous 69 48% 
           Combat 50 35% 
                   Male 50 35% 
                   Female  - - 
           Support 19 13% 
                   Male 12 8% 
                   Female 7 5% 
Non-fighters 59 42% 
                                              Male 23 16% 
                                              Female 36 25% 
 
Po
st-
w
ar
 
 
Occupation  
State 42 30% 
Non-state 100 70% 
 
Mobilization 
Organized 59 42% 
None 83 58% 
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the interview focused on the events of August 14-18, 1992, including the ways in which respondents 
learned about and reacted to the Georgian advance. The discursive mode of the interviews allowed 
me to explore sensitive questions of conflict participation with great flexibility and my respondents 
to reveal their nuanced positions on the conflict. The combination of event and narrative accounts I 
used in the interviews and my attention to ³PHWD-data´ (Fujii 2010), or stories, silences, and physical 
gestures, helped address the issues of memory and reconstruct step by step individual mobilization 
trajectories and understandings of conflict as they evolved over the pre- to post-war period.18   
The resulting interviews are similarly distributed across the four locales, with the nearly 1:1 
ratio between Sukhum/i and Gagra²the key sites of eastern and western mobilization respectively. 
The percentage of fighters (58%) and non-fighters (42%) is balanced, with respondents in support 
roles (14%) allocated between the organized and spontaneous fighter categories based on their pre-
war recruitment. Organized and spontaneous fighters constitute 17% and 83% respectively, which 
reflects actual mobilization patterns. The male (70%) to female (30%) ratio captures the gendered 
nature of mobilization, with combat dominated by men and women represented in support and non-
fighter roles. To account for age and status in mobilization, young adults under the age of 30 (49%)  
at the war onset are distinguished from individuals over 30 years old (51%) with families and jobs. 
This war-time data is situated in the context oIUHVSRQGHQWV¶SUH- and post-war occupations 
and mobilization. I interviewed respondents with a broad range of backgrounds to control for pre-
war factors that could shape war-time decisions and post-war allegiances that could influence how 
people viewed the conflict. To ensure that the interviews capture perspectives other than the master 
narrative of the war, respondents in state and non-state positions are represented in the pre- (20% to 
                                                 
18
 See Online Appendix (pp. 9-15) on the strategies I used to address potential bias in the interviews. 
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80%) and post-war (30% to 70%) periods. Varied pre- and post-war mobilization experiences help 
check that the interviews are not homogeneous across respondents due to organizational affiliation. 
 The interviews are combined with field notes on informal interactions and textual materials, 
each focused on distinct aspects of the conflict (Davenport and Ball 2002). The primary data relates 
fighter and non-fighter pre- to post-war life events, choices, and actions to their social environment. 
Official documents²national and local government resolutions²shift attention from life histories 
to the ways in which the conflict was framed across the state hierarchy. Media transcripts are used 
to capture how official narratives were transmitted across the society. Secondary interview archives 
substantiate these sources and confirm conclusions based on my interviews (Khodzhaa 2003, 2006, 
2009). This multi-level data allows me to trace individual mobilization trajectories in detail within 
their broader socio-structural context. 
COLLECTIVE THREAT FRAMING AND MOBILIZATION IN ABKHAZIA 
 Why did individuals mobilize to fight on the Abkhaz side at the beginning of the Georgian-
Abkhaz war? The Abkhaz were at a significant disadvantage in manpower and arms and could not 
offer material rewards for participation, often associated with joining the fighting (Weinstein 2007; 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). With Georgia establishing control over most of Abkhazia at the 
war onset, looting was reported on the Georgian side.19 The Abkhaz in general were unprepared for 
the Georgian advance and could not provide fighters with access to skills and resources that would 
promote survival relative to non-participation (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Fighters 
across the four locales selected for this research consistently report having to mobilize unarmed and 
witnessing immediate casualties in the fighting on the Abkhaz side.20 Their high-risk mobilization, 
                                                 
19
 Interview 52, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 124, Sukhum/i, Fall 2011. See also HRW (1995, 6). 
20
 Interview 9, Gudauta, Fall 2011; Interview 40, Pitsunda, Fall 2011; Interview 72, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 127, 
Sukhum/i, Winter 2011. 
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especially striking given the availability of alternative options of hiding, fleeing, or defecting to the 
Georgian side, was rooted in the processes beyond material rewards and security maximization. As 
*XWLpUUH]DQG:RRGZULWH³PRELOL]DWLRQLQKLJK-risk circumstances despite the oppor-
tunity to IUHHULGH«>LV@GLIILFXOWWRH[SODLQZLWKVHOI-UHJDUGLQJPDWHULDOSUHIHUHQFHV´ 
 Petersen (2001) argues that high-risk mobilization is affected by the social context in which 
it takes place. ³6WURQJFRPPXQLWLHV produce mechanisms that are able to drive individuals into these 
GDQJHURXVUROHV´6DQFWLRQVRYHUIXWXUHVWDWXVDQGQRUPVXQGHUO\LQJVWUong communities, such 
as the Abkhaz, are among these mechanisms and reflect instrumental and normative social motives 
for mobilization. Those who do not fight for the community can be punished by it later, or vice versa 
rewarded for participation (Taylor 1:HLQVWHLQ+XPSKUH\VDQG:HLQVWHLQ³>7@KH
norm that one should forgo self-LQWHUHVWDQGDFWLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHFROOHFWLYLW\´RUUHFLSURFDWH
actions of its other members taken for its sake, is the basic prescriptive norm (Coleman 1988, 104). 
Given these considerations, Petersen DUJXHV³FRPPXQLW\PHPEHUVDUHIDFHGZLWKDTXHVWLRQKRZ
much ULVNVKRXOG,DFFHSW"´7KHNQRZOHGJHRIULVNE\SRWHQWLDOSDUWLFLSDQWVHYHQLIOLPLWHG
is assumed in this question²a common assumption in the literature on civil war (Kalyvas 2006, 
207; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007, 184). Yet reports across Abkhazia suggest that risk was not well 
understood at the war onset and that this understanding had to be shaped to generate mobilization.21
 I argue that the effect of social mechanisms on mobilization depends on the ways in which 
individuals perceive anticipated risk, or threat.22 ³:KHQWKUHDWLVQRWSHUFHLYHGHYHQ in the face of 
objective evidence, there can be QRPRELOL]DWLRQRIGHIHQVLYHUHVRXUFHV´&RKHQ 93). Threat 
                                                 
21
 Interview 38, Pitsunda, Fall 2011; Interview 74, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 101, Gudauta, Fall 2011; Interview 
117, Sukhum/i, Fall 2011.  
22
 Threat is often defined broadly aVDFWXDORUSHUFHLYHGDWWHPSWVWR³UHGXFH>DJURXS¶V@UHDOL]DWLRQRILWVLQWHUHVWV´
7LOO\,IRFXVRQ³WKUHDWWRDJURXS¶VH[LVWHQFH´DQGWKDWRI ³HQJDJLQJ LQDSDUWLFXODUW\SHRIDFWLYLW\´ i.e. 
mobilization to fight (McDoom 2012, 131; McAdam 1986, 67).   
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can be perceived without being shaped as such, for example, through prior knowledge on imminent 
violence or being in the midst of an attack. However, in the context of uncertainty characteristic of 
FLYLOZDUZKHQ³HYHU\GD\URXWLQHVDQGH[SHFWDQFLHV´DUHGLVUXSWHG and violence can have different 
meanings, individuals rely on familiar social structures for information on threat²whether factual 
or not²and appropriate response (Snow et al. 1998, 2). Confused by the Georgian advance, nearly 
all fighters and non-fighters in Abkhazia report calling upon their families and friends and local and 
national authorities to make sense of threat and mobilization alternatives.23 As Granovetter (1985, 
487) argues, ³>D@FWRUV do not behave or decide as atoms outside a VRFLDOFRQWH[W«7KHLUDWWHPSWV at 
purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems RIVRFLDOUHODWLRQV´ 
One implication of this argument is that in the context of uncertainty presented by civil war 
social structures provide access to information critical for making difficult choices about whether to 
fight for the group, escape the fighting, or defect to the other side. This information centers on three 
basic questions: what the nature of threat is, who threatens, and who is threatened.24 By responding 
to these questions in formal and informal interactions with potential participants, actors in relevant 
social structures frame, or construct, particular narratives of threat.25 ³'HSHQGLQJ on how threats are 
FRQVWUXFWHG´-DVSHU ILQGVRQSURWHVW³LQGLYLGXDOV>FDQEHFRPH@PRUHRSHQ and willing 
WR>PRELOL]H@´7RPRELOL]HVXSSRUWLQFLYLOZDUV³UHFUXLWHUVIUDPHFRQIOLFWVDVWKUHDWVWKDWUHTXLUH
GHIHQVLYHPRELOL]DWLRQV´0DOHW7KHGeorgian advance could have been interpreted as 
an act RIVHFXULQJ$ENKD]LD¶VUDLOURDGIURPUDPSDQWLOOHJDODFWLYLW\²a dominant narrative among 
the Georgian elite,²which would lead to a different mobilization outcome and potentially avert a 
                                                 
23
 Interview 4, Gudauta, Fall 2011; Interview 27, Pitsunda, Fall 2011; Interview 84, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 113, 
Sukhum/i, Winter 2011. 
24
 7KLVLVDNLQWRLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKHLVVXHDQGZKRLVWREODPHRUWKH³DWWULEXWLRQDOFRPSRQHQW of dLDJQRVWLFIUDPLQJ´
in social movements (Benford and Snow 2000, 616).  
25
 )UDPLQJ LQYROYHV JLYLQJ PHDQLQJ WR ³ZKDW ZRXOG RWKHUZLVH EH D PHDQLQJOHVV DVSHFW RI D VFHQH´ *RIIPDQ
1974: 21). See also Benford and Snow (2000). 
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war. Yet it was widely framed and perceived as a threat WR$ENKD]LD¶VSROLWLFDOVWDWXVDQGWKHH[LV-
tence of the Abkhaz as a group, which required defensive mobilization in response.26 
Threat framing involves a range of actors, whose narratives compete and interact with one 
another. Social structures filter threat narratives based on shared understandings of conflict. While 
norms provide a general prescription for action, shared understandings of history and identity that 
emerge in the course of conflict fill the content of what the interests of a collectivity are and how to 
act in support of these interests (Wood 2003; Viterna 2013). To resonate with potential participants, 
threat framing actors appeal to this common history and the relationships that it affects. As Gould 
(1995, 18) says, mobilizing appeals ³VXFFHHGWRWKHGHJUHH that the collective identity [they] invoke 
FODVVLILHVSHRSOHLQDZD\WKDW«FRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHLUFRQFUHWHH[SHULHQFHRIVRFLDOWLHVWRRWKHUV´27 
TKH*HRUJLDQHOLWH¶VQDUUDWLYHRQWKHDGYDQFHGLGnot resonate with most Abkhaz precisely because 
of their collective view of the history of the Georgian-Abkhaz relations as one of the suppression of 
$ENKD]LD¶VDXWRQRP\DQGWKH Abkhaz as a group, substantiated by their own and their families¶ and 
IULHQGV¶ lived experiences.28 <HWQHLWKHUZDVWKH$ENKD]HOLWH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDFFHSWHGDVJLYHQ 
7KUHDWQDUUDWLYHVGRQRWVXFFHHGLQVKDSLQJSHRSOH¶VWKUHDWSHUFHSWLRQVE\PHUHO\LQYRNLQJ
common notions of conflict; they are negotiated across social structures and can shift in translation. 
Because potential participants are embedded in multiple social structures with varying salience for 
mobilization, elite threat framing²a focus in the conflict literature²can be insufficient for them to 
act upon or even accept the idea of threat.29 ³7KHFUHDWRUVRIWK>H@ script are usually threatened elites 
                                                 
26
 Interview 8, Gudauta, Fall 2011; Interview 29, Pitsunda, Fall 2011; Interview 53, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 107, 
Sukhum/i, Fall 2011. Another Georgian narrative focused on the rescue of Georgian hostages ostensibly kept in 
Abkhazia (Fuller 1992). On the reasons provided by Georgia, see Cornell (2000, 159), Nodia and Scoltbach (2006, 
12), Zverev (1996).  
27
 7KHVHWLHVFDQEH³LPDJLQHGUDWKHUWKDQH[SHULHQFHGGLUHFWO\´3ROOHWWDDQG-DVSHU 
28
 Interview 80, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 114, Sukhum/i, Fall 2011. 
29
 See Posen (1993), Kaufmann (1996), and Roe (2004) on elite threat framing in Yugoslavia and Valentino (2004) 
and Straus (2006) in Rwanda. See Petersen (2002) for a review. 
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in WKHFDSLWDO´)XMLL (2009, 12-3) demonstrates, but their narratives are adapted by local leaders ³WR
ILWORFDOQHHGVDQGUHTXLUHPHQWV´7KHILOWHULQJRIQDWLRQDOWKUHDWQDUUDWLYHVWKURXJKORFDOVWUXFWXUHV
is evident in Abkhazia, where respondents report initially receiving the televised messages of threat 
from the Abkhaz government, but then corroborating these messages with local administration and 
organization leaders, which frequently shifted the emphasis from the defense of Abkhazia to that of 
villages, towns, and cities.30 ,QWKLVZD\³>S@UHZDUSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVVWXGHQWV¶ DQGYHWHUDQV¶JURXSV
and religious organizations, among RWKHUVDUHUHSXUSRVHGIRUUHEHOOLRQ´DWWKHWKUHDWIUDPLQJVWDJH
of mobilization (Staniland 2012, 17). 
Political and social leaders are not the only actors framing threat, however. Individuals can 
be linked to local leaders and organizational recruiters through indirect ties of acquaintance. These 
³ZHDNWLHV´LQ*UDQRYHWWHU¶VWHUPVDUHFULWLFDOIRUWKHGLIIXVLRQRILQIRUPDWLRQLQ the 
national-to-ORFDOILOWHULQJRIWKUHDWQDUUDWLYHVEXWODFN³WKHDPRXQWRIWLPHWKHHPRWLRQDOLQWHQVLW\
WKHLQWLPDF\PXWXDOFRQILGLQJDQGWKHUHFLSURF>LW\@´WKDWLQGLYLGXDOVGUDZRQLQWKHFRQWH[WRI
uncertainty. Reputation of and respect for national and local leaders are important to the credibility 
RIWKHLUPHVVDJHV%HQIRUGDQG6QRZ<HWLWLV³VWURQJquotidian WLHV´RIIDPLO\DQGIULHQGV
which ³DOORZIRUWUXVW´WKDWFRQVROLGDWHWKHLUPHVVDJHVLQWRFROOHFWLYHQRWLRQVRIWKUHDW3DUNLQVRQ
2013, 422-3, emphasis in original). Most participants and non-participants in Abkhaz mobilization 
report reinforcing the view of the Georgian advance as threatening and deciding how to respond to 
this threat with their family members and friends in neighborhoods, universities, and workplaces. 
Both those who mobilized to fight and escaped the fighting often did so with their family members 
and friends as a result.31 $V$VSLQDOOILQGV³NLQVKLSQHWZRUNVWLHVRIORFDOLW\DQGIULHQG-
VKLS´VHUYHDVPDjor social settings for high-risk mobilization. 
                                                 
30
 Interview 97, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 118, Sukhum/i, Fall 2011.  
31
 Interview 72, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 117, Sukhum/i, Fall 2011. 
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The emergence of collective notions of threat influences how individuals come to perceive 
WKUHDWDQGZKDWPRELOL]DWLRQGHFLVLRQVWKH\PDNH&ROOHFWLYHWKUHDWIUDPLQJ³JXLGHVSHUFHSWLRQ«
allowing [individuals] WREXLOGGH¿QHG expectations about what is WRKDSSHQ´ (Donati 1992, 141-2). 
Many participants report interpreting the Georgian advance as a clash, such as the one in 1989, but 
coming to view it as a war once threat framing messages spread across the society.32 While collec-
WLYHQRWLRQVRIWKUHDWXUJHSRWHQWLDOSDUWLFLSDQWVWRSHUFHLYHWKUHDWLQJHQHUDOLWLVLQGLYLGXDOV¶WLHV
to the collectivity and shared understandings of conflict invoked in threat framing that differentiate 
how individuals perceive threat and decide to act upon threat narratives. Individuals, whose lived 
experiences as part of the group resonate with collective notions of threat, perceive the collectivity 
to be threatened and join the fighting on its behalf, even if it is a significantly weaker actor in the 
war. In contrast, those, whose ties to the collectivity are severed by alternative group obligations, 
perceive personal security to be at greatest threat and attempt to hold neutrality, hide, flee, or join 
the fighting on the side that can provide greater security (Kalyvas 2006). The Abkhaz consistently 
report mobilizing on the Abkhaz side because they were convinced that Abkhazia and the Abkhaz 
as a group were threatened by the Georgian advance, while those who feared for their own security 
or that of close family and friends escaped the fighting, alone or together.33 
In this way, threat framing interacts with instrumental and normative motivations that drive 
individuals in the context of mobilization against superior state and non-state forces when the exit 
option exists. Individuals who perceive threat as directed primarily toward the self or close family 
and friends act in attainment of personal or kin security. Their non-fighting trajectories reflect their 
security maximizing motivation. If they do mobilize to fight on the weaker side, it is to protect their  
 
                                                 
32
 Interview 49, Pitsunda, Fall 2011; Interview 97, Gagra, Fall 2011. 
33
 Interview 9, Gudauta, Fall 2011; Interview 47, Pitsunda, Fall 2011; Interview 84, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 104, 
Sukhum/i, Fall 2011. 
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Figure 2. Self- to Other-Regarding Mobilization Continuum 
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families and friends, rather than the broader collectivity. I place these actions on the self-regarding 
end of the mobilization continuum (see Figure 2 above). In contrast, individuals who perceive threat 
as directed toward their collectivity act to defend the collectivity at the local and national levels of 
aggregation. Some fighters stay to defend their villages, towns, or cities, while others go to the sites 
of fierce fighting. A weaker side, their collectivity offers little prospect of security or success. Their 
fighter trajectories reflect normative commitments and are placed toward the other-regarding end.  
This distinction between self- and collectivity-oriented threat perceptions I introduce is one 
way in which instrumental and normative motives coexist in mobilization. As Gutiérrez and Wood 
(2014, 200, 222) DUJXH³>Q@RWDOOFRPEDWDQWVILJKWIRULQVWUXPHQWDOUHDVRQVVRPHMRLQ for normati-
ve reaVRQV«>DQG@DFWRQVLQFHUHEHOLHIVDQGRWKHU-UHJDUGLQJSUHIHUHQFHV´7KHIXUWKHURQH moves 
away from the self-regarding end of the continuum, the more possibility exists for non-instrumental 
motivations. However, even this other-regarding behavior may be driven by instrumental concerns, 
including community rewards for participating and punishment for not doing so. My argument thus 
is not about whether norms matter. For example, individuals concerned with personal security can 
be said to be following the norm of self-protection. Neither is it about whether individuals follow 
norms for purely instrumental or normative reasons. For example, individuals who flee with family 
or friends may do so for both self- and (kin) other-regarding reasons. As Fearon and Wendt (2002, 
HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDOVXJJHVW³WKHUHLVOLWWOHUHDVRQWRWKLQNWKDWKXPDQEHKDYLRUWRZDUGQRUPV
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is either always self-interested or always DIXQFWLRQRISHUFHLYHGOHJLWLPDF\´5DWKHUZKDWPDWWHUV
is to what extent individual threat perceptions and associated actions concern the broader group.  
THREAT FRAMING AT THE GEORGIAN-ABKHAZ WAR ONSET: AUGUST 14-18, 1992 
 On the morning of August 14, 1992, troops of the Georgian National Guard²the Georgian 
nascent army²crossed the Ingur/i Bridge from Georgia to the east of Abkhazia.34 According to the 
Abkhaz de facto Defense Ministry, the troops were equipped with tanks and artillery and supported 
IURPDLU3DFKXOLMD7KH\³DGYDQFHGRQ6XNKXPLDQGVKHOOHGWKHSDUOLDPHQWIRUFLQJWKH
Abkhaz leadeUVKLSWRUHWUHDWWR*XGDXWDLQWKHQRUWKZHVWRIWKHUHSXEOLF´&RUQHOO7KH
IROORZLQJPRUQLQJ*HRUJLDQPDULQHVODQGHGLQ*DQWLDGL7VDQGU\SVKLQ$ENKD]LD¶VZHVW35 They 
³EORFN>HG@$ENKD]LD¶VERUGHUZLWK5XVVLD´DQGDGYDQFHGRQ*DJUDZLWKVXSSRUt of the Mkhedrioni 
(Horsemen)²the Georgian paramilitary group that became active in Abkhazia after the clashes of 
July, 1989 (Baev 2003, 138; Darchiashvili 1997). Within three days, the Georgian forces controlled 
Sukhum/i and Gagra, with the adjacent territory to the east and west respectively, part of which was 
blockaded, leaving the area surrounding Gudauta under the Abkhaz control (see Figure 1 above). 
 Today the events of August 14-18 have a clear meaning in Abkhazia. They are remembered 
as the first days of what became known as the Patriotic War of Abkhazia²a culmination of the long 
struggle for Abkhaz political, economic, and cultural self-determination.36 Political tensions around 
the status of Abkhazia, which preceded the war, were part of this struggle.37 Achugba (2010, 256-7) 
summarizes the issues that the Abkhaz raised in public letters and gatherings in the Soviet period: 
                                                 
34
 Troop estimates vary between 2,000 and 5,000 (Pachulija 2010, 27; Baev 2003, 138), but may be inflated as the 
Abkhaz Press Service reported 1,000 on the day of the advance (Lezhava 1999, 102). 
35
 Estimates of Georgian marines range from 250 to 1,000 (Pachulija 2010, 77; Baev 2003, 138). 
36
 Lakoba (1993) refers to this struggle as the hundred-year war between Georgia and Abkhazia. 
37
 For example, on -XO\$ENKD]LD¶VQRQ-Georgian leadership, in the absence of Georgian officials, reinstated 
the 1925 SovLHW6RFLDOLVW5HSXEOLF&RQVWLWXWLRQZKLFKGHFODUHG$ENKD]LD³DVLQGHSHQGHQWEXWµXQLWHG with the Soviet 
6RFLDOLVW5HSXEOLFRI*HRUJLDRQWKHEDVLVRIDVSHFLDOXQLRQWUHDW\¶´&RUQHOOVHHDOVR+HZLWW1RGLD
and Scholtbach 2006). 
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The ending of the demographic expansion of Georgians in Abkhazia, protection of the ethnic 
Abkhaz history, restoration of the native Abkhaz toponymy, preparation of Abkhaz national 
FDGUHV«OLEHUDWLRQRI$ENKD]LDIURP*HRUJLD¶VGLFWDWRUVKLS²this is an incomplete list of 
LVVXHVUDLVHGE\WKH$ENKD]«EHIRUHWKHFHQWUDODXWKRULWLHV of the Soviet Union. 
Most Abkhaz view the war of 1992-DJDLQVWWKLVEDFNJURXQG³7KLVZDUZHQWdown in history 
as Patriotic´DVSHHFK at the 10-\HDUDQQLYHUVDU\RIWKHZDULOOXVWUDWHV³Everyone understood well: 
the fate of Abkhazia was being decided in a fierce struggle²should our people be free or dependent, 
should we have national statehood, language and culture, or lose everything´(QLN-9).  
In 1992, however, these events were not as well understood. There was intense uncertainty 
and confusion over the meaning of the Georgian advance. Witnesses report: ³7DQNVHQWHUHGall of a 
sudden RQ$XJXVW´,QWHUYLHZ3LWVXQGD)DOO ³No one understood what was going on: 
KRZVHULRXVLWZDVKRZORQJLWZRXOGODVWZKHWKHULWZDVDZDU´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO
Most Abkhaz did not expect a war and interpreted the events as a clash similar to that of July, 1989, 
DQWLFLSDWLQJSURWHFWLRQIURPWKHIDOOLQJ6RYLHWVWUXFWXUHV³:Hdid not believe that a war could start, 
felt that we were protected by the powerful Soviet 8QLRQ´,QWHUYLHZ3LWVXQGD)DOO ³:H
thought it would be over right away, that it was another clash´,QWHUYLHZ3LWVXQGD)DOO
In other words, ordinary men and women in Abkhazia, many of whom shortly mobilized to fight on 
the Abkhaz side, were shocked by the Georgian advance, but did not perceive it as a threat. 
Neither was the Georgian explanation convincing. The advance took place amid the internal 
conflict that ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia from Tbilisi and persisted as the new leadership 
struggled to control his supporters, Zviadists (Driscoll 2009). *HRUJLD¶VHOLWHLQWKLVFRQWH[WDVVHUWHG
WKDWWKH*HRUJLDQIRUFHVZHUH³VHFXULQJURDGDQGUDLOOLQNV>LQ$ENKD]LD@«LQWKHKXQWIRUWKH secu-
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rity RIILFLDOVWDNHQKRVWDJH´ by Zviadists (Fuller, 1992).38 This message did not find support among 
potential participants in Abkhazia. ³7KH\VDLGWKDWWKH\FDPHWRJXDUGWKH railroad, but how can you 
guard the railroad with tanks"´ZDVWKHFRPPRQTXHVWLRQ,QWHUYLHZ3LWVXQGD)DOOInter-
view 8, Gudauta, Fall 2011; Interview 78, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 107, Sukhum/i, Fall 2011).  
In the confusion over the Georgian advance, in order for Abkhaz mobilization to take place, 
threat posed by the advance had to be perceived. Individuals who did not view the advance as threa-
tening did not mobilize in response. The SRIF reservists in the east of Abkhazia who were the first 
to face the Georgian forces and were immediately imprisoned as a result corroborate this argument: 
Six reservists were on duty at the Okhurej post [near the Ingur/i Bridge]. A car with soldiers 
FDPHE\«7KH$ENKD]ILJKWHUVdid not have time to understand the situation, as they were 
FDSWXUHGDQG«SODFHGLQFXVWRG\RIWKH*DOLSROLFHGHSDUWPHQW«$VWKHVXUYLYLQJILJKWHUV
said, they did not expect a battle, thinking that Zviadists wanted to sneak through the post or 
that some car did not comply (Pachulija 2010, 29-30, emphasis added). 
Mobilization of SRIF fighters at the nearby Okhurej garrison began after they heard the fired shots. 
Similarly, whole villages did not mobilize until threat of the Georgian advance was perceived. ³2Q
WKHILUVWGD\RIWKHZDU´DILJKWHUZKRODWHUPRELOL]HGLQWKHHDVWHUQYLOODJHRI0HUNXODLOOXVWUDWHV 
Georgian soldiers came in and out of our vLOODJH«,WZDVTXLWHDQGFDOPIRUDPRQWK>DQG@
QRRQHRUJDQL]HGYLOODJHGHIHQVH«Georgians began burning homes of local Abkhaz and 
5XVVLDQVDQGDIWHUWKDWNLOOLQJWKHP«%XW>PRELOL]DWLRQ@EHJDQafter the arrival of [a local 
villager informed in] the west (Interview in Khodzhaa 2003, 123, emphasis added).  
 The timing of mobilization suggests that threat perception was in part situational: organized 
fighters at the Okhurej garrison came to view the Georgian forces as threatening by virtue of being 
                                                 
38
 Whether *HRUJLD¶VOHDGHU6KHYDUGQDG]HZDVLQFRQWURORIWKHIRUFHVLVGHEDWHG%DHY 138). 
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positioned on the route of the Georgian advance. This pattern characterizes initial resistance to the 
Georgian forces by organized fighters in the east of Abkhazia. In further organized and spontaneous 
mobilization, however, threat was framed, as the MerkuODYLOODJHU¶VDUULYDODQGVXEVHTXHQWPRELOL-
zation indicate. The following sections address in detail the questions of how potential participants 
in Abkhaz mobilization came to perceive threat and how threat framing shaped their mobilization 
decisions by focusing on the organized fighter, spontaneous fighter, and non-fighter trajectories in 
the east and west of Abkhazia. Despite the spatial and temporal variation, mobilization in these sites 
followed a typical pattern. Threat framing appeals were filtered and consolidated across the society 
to produce a collective notion of threat and influence threat perceptions and mobilization decisions. 
Organized Mobilization: Situational Threat Perception and the Chain of Command  
 How did the Abkhaz come to perceive the Georgian advance as threatening? Some drew on 
SULRUNQRZOHGJHDERXWSRWHQWLDOYLROHQFH7KHVLVWHURIDQ$ENKD]DFWLYLVWUHSRUWV³0\EURWKHU felt 
that there would be a war+HZDVHYHQFDOOHGDQH[WUHPLVWIRULW´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO
Yet even informed individuals, such as military commanders and leaders of the Abkhaz movement, 
did not immediately perceive threat when the Georgian advance began. The SRIF commander who 
inspected the Ingur/i Bridge on its eve was startled by the advance. A witness describes his reaction:  
$XJXVWZDVDUHJXODUGD\RQGXW\«6XGGHQO\>WKHFRPPDQGHU@looked out of the 
ZLQGRZ«>DQG@JDYHDFRPPDQG³$ODUP´1RWXQGHUVWDQGLQJZKDWZDVKDSSHQLQJ,VDLG
WKDWHYHU\WKLQJZDVLQRUGHU%XWKHUHSHDWHG³>$@ODUP´5HDOL]LQJWKDW>KHPHDQW@FRPEDW
alert, I told him to turn on the siren, the button was in his office. As he came to his senses, he 
gave the signal [to mobilize] (Interview in Khodzhaa 2003, 17, emphasis added). 
7KHFRPPDQGHU¶VWKUHDWSHUFHSWLRQZas situational, just as it was for the SRIF regulars and 
reservists who were not demobilized before the war and were located in the midst of the advance²
along the single road connecting the territory of Abkhazia from east to west. Organized fighters in 
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the HDVWRIIHUHGLQLWLDOUHVLVWDQFHRQFHWKH\KHDUGRUVDZ³DFROXPQRI*HRUJLDQ«tanks and troops 
[e]ngaged in gunfire´ (Interview in Khodzhaa 2003, 57, emphasis added). As they were approached 
by the Georgian forces, a few fighters at the Okhurej garrison and nearby Gudava post opened fire 
with the limited weapons that they were assigned, but had to retreat to the west and clashed with the 
Georgian forces midway to Sukhum/i (Pachulija 2010, 30, 34; Interview in Khodzhaa 2006, 158). 
The chain of command played a major role in organized mobilization thereafter. Organized 
fighters of the Agudzera unit further along the road were ordered to block the bridge on the outskirts 
of WKHFDSLWDO$65,)UHJXODUUHSRUWV³WKHGHSXW\FRPPDQGHUFDOOHG«DQGJDYHWKHorder«to set 
RXWWRFORVHWKH.HODVXUL%ULGJH´,QWHUYLHZLQ.KRG]KDDHPSKDVLVDGGHG7KLVWDVN was 
impeded by the first battle that broke out with the unit. $SDUWLFLSDQWUHSRUWV³>RQHILJKWHUblocked] 
the road with an armored vehicle and took the fight. [He w]as shot, but caused [the Georgian forces] 
losses´,QWHUYLHZLQ.KRG]KDD8SWRUHJXODUVDQGUHVHUYLVWVMRLQHGLQWKHILJKWLQJ
but were overwhelmed and received the order to retreat. These and other fighters were instructed to 
take defense of the Red Bridge at the entry into the capital, where they were assisted by spontaneous 
fighters, many of whom unarmed, and held the Georgian forces until the stand-off and negotiations.  
The role of command in organized mobilization was evident in the west of Abkhazia, where 
the Georgian marines landed on August 15. A local SRIF commander reports the order he received: 
³KHDGRIWKH*DJUDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQFDOOHGDQGSDVVHGWKHorder of the [SRIF] command to take guard 
of the Psou-Gagra URDG«,[took] regulars and DODUJHQXPEHURIXQDUPHGUHVHUYLVWV´ (Interview in 
Khodzhaa 2009, 437-8, emphasis added). These men were similarly joined by spontaneous fighters 
DQG³VWRRGDORQJWKHPDLQURDG«EORFNHGLWZLWKD truck [and] VDQGEDJV´,QWHUYLHZ 27, Pitsunda, 
Fall 2011); ³PLQHGDURFNVORSHDQGOHIWDURDGEORFNRQWKHZD\WR*DJUD´(Interview in Khodzhaa 
2009, 440). However, only a minority of fighters had access to the organized structure of command.  
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Spontaneous Mobilization: Collective Threat Framing 
 Most men and women in the east and west of Abkhazia, including discharged reservists and 
spontaneous fighters who mobilized outside of the SRIF structure, did not have prior knowledge or 
situational awareness but sought information from social structures that they interacted with in daily 
life and trusted as a result. A school teacher who mobilized spontaneously in the west summarizes 
the sense of uncertainty, mistrust of the Georgian narrative, and collective threat framing involved: 
Train raids were cRPPRQ«*HRUJLDXVHGWKLVDVDpretense« It all happened unexpectedly 
in August. We suspected something, but even that day when we saw ships we could not tell: 
DVKLSLVDVKLS«$QKRXUODWHUP\friend found me and said that [Georgian] marines were 
landing« By then there was the [state]  message on TV about the beginning of aggression«
We moved toward Gagra. Here [the head of]  administration JDWKHUHGWKHSHRSOH«+HVDLG
³7KHUHDUHbattles, shootings, the aviation«´:HGHFLGHGJLYHQRXUVPDOOQXPEHUV>DQG@
ODFNRIZHDSRQV«WRUHWUHDWDQGRUJDQL]HFLW\GHIHQVH,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO 
Threat framing proceeded from the national elite messages to the local level, often shifting to focus 
on city, town, and village defense, but was indorsed with quotidian networks of family and friends. 
³$WWDFNDQG$JJUHVVLRQ´From Elites to Family 
Threatened by the Georgian advance and displaced from Sukhum/i by the Georgian forces, 
the national Abkhaz elite served as the primary source of threat framing in Abkhazia. Soon after the 
Georgian advance began on August 14, Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia Ardzinba 
appealed to the population in the emergency address:  
I appeal to you at this difficult time. Our land was invaded by the armed formations of the 
6WDWH&RXQFLORI*HRUJLD«WKDWVSUHDGdeath and destruction«7KH$ENKD]DQGWKHHQWLUH
population of our long-VXIIHULQJ0RWKHUODQGDUHEHLQJDGGHGWR«WKHblood spilled by the 
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>*HRUJLDQ@OHDGHUVKLS«,WKLQNWKDWZHKDYHWRUHVLVW«>DQG@GHIHDWWKRVHZKREULQJKRVWL-
lity (Ardzinba 2004, 5, emphasis added). 
This formal address responded to the questions of who is threatened, by whom, and to what extent. 
It presented the advance as an attack (the nature of threat) by the Georgian aggressor (the agent of 
threat), threatening not only the Abkhaz, but also the entire population of Abkhazia (the subject of 
threat), and advocated defensive mobilization in response. Other statements of the Abkhaz national 
leadership reaffirmed AUG]LQED¶VWKUHDWQDUUDWLYH)RUH[DPSOH5HVROXWLRQRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXQFLO
RI$XJXVW³2QPRELOL]DWLRQRIWKHDGXOWSRSXODWLRQDQGDUPVWUDQVIHU´XUJHGDOOFLWL]HQV-40 
years old to mobilize in defense due to ³real threat WKDWDSSHDUHGWR« Abkhazia [and] the life of the 
SRSXODWLRQ´$UG]LQEDHPSKDVLVDGGHG39 These threat framing messages were broadcast 
on television and widely publicized in print press across Abkhazia. 
 Elite messages resonated with many Abkhaz. In their appeals, the national elite drew on the 
shared history of Abkhazia as a ³ORQJ-VXIIHULQJ0RWKHUODQG´DQGDVWDWH²³HYHU\FLWL]HQDFFRUGLQJ
WRDOOFRQVWLWXWLRQVPXVWGHIHQGWKHLUVWDWH´$UG]LQEDH[SODLQHG$UG]LQED=DQWDULD
43).40 They, furthermore, invoked the intimate and familiar ties that were disrupted by the Georgian 
advance. ³,WLVQRWHDV\WRVSHDN´$UG]LQEDVWUHVVHGLQKLVDGGUHVV³ZKHQSHUKDSVULJKWQRZ« our 
homes are robbed, people are beaten, and life itself LVQRWJXDUDQWHHG´$UG]LQED2004, 5, emphasis 
added)$UG]LQED¶VUHSXWDWLRQDVDIHUYHQWGHIHQGHURI$ENKD]ULJKWVORQJUHVSHFWHGLQWKHVRFLHW\
added the credibility to elite messages.41 Respondents in the east and west of Abkhazia consistently 
                                                 
39
 7KH&RXQFLO¶VDGGUHVVWRWKHSRSXODWLRQRI$XJXVWFRUURERUDWHGWKUHDW³'HDWKWRDOO«ZKRcame to us with arms 
>WKHQDWXUHRIWKUHDW@«enemies [(the agent of threat)] of the entire multinational people of Abkhazia [(the subject 
RIWKUHDW@´$UG]LQED-6, emphasis added).  
40
 Acting as a state, RQ 6HSWHPEHU  WKH 6XSUHPH &RXQFLO IRUPDOO\ UHFRJQL]HG *HRUJLD¶V DGYDQFH DV DQ DFW RI
aggression and formed the State Defense Committee (see text in Ardzinba 2004, 160). 
41
 Abkhaz support for Ardzinba formed in the pre-ZDUSHULRG+LVVSHHFKDWWKH,3HRSOH¶V'HSXWLHV&RQJUHVVRIWKH
Soviet Union in 1989 (see text in Maryhuba 1994, 463-7) is recounted as a defining moment in his emergence as a 
³OHDGHU«ZKR FRXOGEUDYHO\JHWXSDQGVD\ZKDWWKHWUXHFRQGLWLRQRIWKH$ENKD]ZDV´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO
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report that they learned about GeorgiD¶VDGYDQFHDQGXQGHUVWRRGLWDVDQDWWDFNUHTXLULQJGHIHQVLYH
PRELOL]DWLRQIURPWKHVHPHVVDJHV³, came back from work and learned that the war began on 79´
,QWHUYLHZLQ.KRG]KDDHPSKDVLVDGGHG³$UG]LQED[told]  us that an armed attack was 
carried out against Abkhazia and that we will resist´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO 
Yet elite threat framing was insufficient for most to decide how to act upon the information 
about the Georgian advance. Political and social actors at the local level, including highly regarded 
administration and Abkhaz movement leaders, further advanced elite threat framing.42 After seeing 
$UG]LQED¶VWHOHYLVHGDGGUHVVFURZGVSRXUHGWRORFDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQVDFURVV$ENKD]LD7KHVHFLW\
town, and village centers have historically served as places of assembly for the Abkhaz population. 
Men and women knew that they would get more information from actors in this social setting. My 
interviews confirm their role at the war onset: ³:KHQWKHZDUEHJDQ ,«ZHQWWRWKHadministration. 
Everyone gathered there and expected a message IURPWKHOHDGHUV´,QWHUYLHZ6XNKXPL)DOO
2011); ³3HRSOHVWRRGE\WKHvillage council«GHEDW>LQJ@ZKDWKDSSHQHG«:KHQ>DORFDODFWLYLVW@
DSSURDFKHGWKH\H[FODLPHGµ+Hwill tell us something seriouV¶´ (Interview 64, Gagra, Fall 2011). 
Local actors corroborated the national narrative, but adapted it to the purposes of city, town, 
and village defense. The address of the administration of Tqvarchel/i²an eastern blockaded city²
is exemplary. It began by IUDPLQJWKUHDWSRVHGE\*HRUJLDWRWKHZKROHRI$ENKD]LD³7KHrepublic 
[(the subject of threat)] is in danger7RGD\«troops of the State Council of Georgia, accompanied 
by tanks [(the agent RIWKUHDW@«invaded the territory of Abkhazia in order to occupy it [(the nature 
RIWKUHDW@´&KHUNH]LMD 84, emphasis added). The address went on to suit the particular needs 
RIFLW\GHIHQVH³'XHWRWKHstate of emergency in Tqvarcheli, general mobilization of men 18 to 45 
                                                 
2011). This support continues. At current memorial and celebratory events, the Abkhaz refer to Ardzinba as the 
spiritual core of Abkhazia²³DVDLQW DGRPHZKHUH\RXSUD\´)LHOGQRWHV2FWREHU 31, 2011). 
42
 Other key actors include the elders, leaders in employment and education units, and military men. 
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\HDUVRIDJHLVGHFODUHG«*HWUHDG\IRUcity defense´&KHUNH]LMDHPSKDVLVDGGHG7KLV
message was immediately aired on local television. Similar filtering of the national narrative took 
place in the west of Abkhazia. As a participating fighter illustrates, ³µ*DJUD LVDSHDUO¶>WKHhead of 
administration] told usµ:HPD\not have battles in the city«¶6RZHKDGWRretreat back to the old 
[part of the] city and take defense positions >WKHUH@´,QWHUYLHZ3LWVXQGD)DOO 
Threat framing was often substantiated by Georgian statements and actions at the local level. 
On August 15, for example, Sukhum/i channels aired the Georgian leader 6KHYDUGQDG]H¶VZDUQLQJ
WKDW³LQWKHVWUXJJOH for preservation of the territorial integrity RI>*HRUJLD@«ZHDUHZLOOLQJWR die, 
but also eliminate anyone´%URMGRHPSKDVLVDGGHG43 The images of looting showed the 
Georgian IRUFHV¶ brutality. ³:HZHQWWRWKHhomes where people were tortured, robbed; aired this in 
*DJUD´DORFDOUHSRUWHUVD\V,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO7KHLPDJHVDQGORFDOWKUHDWIUDPLQJ
LQJHQHUDOUHDVVXUHGWKH$ENKD]WKDWDZDUEHJDQ³Now we understood what we faced²weaponry, 
WDQNVPDUDXGLQJ´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO³, was assured that a war really began, that the 
Georgian forces occupied DSDUWRI$ENKD]LD´ (Interview in Khodzhaa 2003, 216, emphasis added). 
However, it is within the quotidian networks of family and friends that this information was 
typically consolidated into collective notions of threat and transformed into mobilization decisions. 
A spontaneous fighter in the east captures this process of consolidation across the social structures: 
2Q$XJXVW«,ZDVDWZRUN«$WDPZHZHQWRXWVLGHGXHWRQRLVH«1Rt understand-
ing anything, all family JDWKHUHGE\WKH79«>:HVDZ@$UG]LQED¶VDGGUHVV [(national)] on 
WKHVWDUWRIDJJUHVVLRQ« [and] formation of battalions to defend the motherland. Right after, 
the Abkhaz population of Tamysh gathered [(local)], where a village defense group was 
IRUPHG«>0\relative@«WRRNDFRXSOHRIfriends [(quotidian)], went to the [SRIF] XQLW«
                                                 
43
 The Georgian commander .DUNDUDVKYLOL¶VSURPLVHWRVDFULILFH³*HRUJLDQV>WRkill]  all 97,000 [Abkhaz]´
was broadcast on August 25 (Amkuab 1992, 128, emphasis added). 
29 
 
EURXJKW>EDFNZHDSRQV@«>DQGR@Q his initiative ZHEHJDQVKRRWLQJDW>*HRUJLD¶V@PLOLWDU\
convoy moving along the main road (Interview in Khodzhaa 2003, 85-6, emphasis added). 
In the east and west of Abkhazia, relatives and friends in neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces 
alerted one another of threat based on the information that they received from the national and local 
actors: ³0\ son was studying in 5XVVLD« I told him about the war [and] he left it all to come KHUH«
I VHQWKLPWR>ILJKW@´,QWHUYLHZ 3LWVXQGD)DOO³,ZDVKRPHSLFNLQJWHD«>0\@neighbor 
called urgently and said that the war began´,QWHUYLHZLQ.KRG]KDD, emphasis added).  
Informal interactions with family members and friends offered the level of validation to the 
idea of threat and the need to mobilize in response that is only possible in this private social setting. 
Threat framing in this setting often took form of a blessing. As organized and spontaneous fighters 
FRQILUP³0\IDWKHU>WROGPH@ZKDWKDSSHQHG«+HJDYHPHKLVULIOHVFKHHVH>DQG@DORDI of bread 
DQGVDLGµGo where your friends are¶>DQG@,ZHQW´,QWHUYLHZ 3LWVXQGD)DOO³You only 
try to return´ a mother blessed her daughter to fight in the war (Interview 39, Pitsunda, Fall 2011).  
As the collective notion of threat of the Georgian advance consolidated, difficult mobiliza-
WLRQGHFLVLRQVZHUHPDGHDWWKHTXRWLGLDQOHYHO³)LUVW I was in shock, then we began gathering with 
friends, relatives, deciding what to do´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO³:HEHJDQcalling all our 
[sports team] boys E\SKRQH«JDWKHUHGDWWKHVSRUWVJURXQGWRdiscuss what to do«>DQG@IRUPHG
around close ones´(Interview 75, Gagra, Fall 2011). The resulting narodnoe opolchenie SHRSOH¶V
IRUFH³ZDVIRUPHGRQWKHEDVLVRIlocation and friendship ties´ (Interview 47, Pitsunda, Fall 2011). 
³1DURGQRH2SROFKHQLH´)RU)DPLOLHV9LOODJHVDQGWKH1DWLRQ 
Why did threat framing resonate with the Abkhaz? The shared understandings of history and 
identity invoked by the national, local, and quotidian actors were related to individual experiences 
as part of the Abkhaz group. Fighters came to view the Georgian advance as an attempt to eliminate 
Abkhazia as a separate political entity and the Abkhaz as its core cultural unit. This notion drew on 
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the political, economic, and cultural repression in the Soviet Georgian state that fighters shared in 
directly, through family KLVWRU\RUFROOHFWLYHPHPRU\7KLVH[FHUSWUHSUHVHQWVILJKWHUV¶UHVSRQVHV 
I participated in the war because since childhood, we lived in the society where the Abkhaz 
were humiliated, eradicated. Our language, last names ZHUHFKDQJHGWR*HRUJLDQ«>VR@
that there would be no Abkhaz«>RU@Abkhazia²the land that [Georgians] considered to be 
their own. But it is our, Abkhaz land«>7KXV@ZHhad to struggle (Interview 114, Sukhum/i, 
Fall 2011).  
That their land and people, the constituent parts of the collective Abkhaz identity, were threatened, 
PHDQWWRSRWHQWLDOSDUWLFLSDQWVWKDWPRELOL]DWLRQZDVUHTXLUHGLQGHIHQVH³:Hrealized that we had 
to seriously resist, we had no other motherland´,QWHUYLHZ6XNKXPL)DOO7KHGXW\ to 
Abkhazia and the Abkhaz is reported as the key motivation to fight across the interviews: ³:KHWKHU
we remain alive or not, it is our duty to defend our native land´,QWHUYLHZ3LWVXQGD)DOO
All fighters who mobilized on the Abkhaz side characterize the war as Patriotic as a result. 
 However, some fighters mobilized to defend their homes and localities, while others left the 
native villages, towns, and cities to join mobilization in the sites of intense fighting, specifically by 
Sukhum/i and Gagra. The differences in the roles that individuals adopted suggest that they viewed 
threat as posed to their collectivity at its different levels of aggregation. $WWDFNVRQKRXVHV³created 
«DFRUHRIILJKWHUVGHWHUPLQHGWRUHJDLQORVWKRPHV´ (HRW 1995, 23). As fighters explain, ³7KH\
cleared my house, killed my dog, offended my father²all this boiled up and I united people around 
PHWRILJKW´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO ³,WZDVQRWRQO\WKH$ENKD] who fought. Everyone 
was defending their families, elders, and children´Interview 12, Pitsunda, Fall 2011).  
7KHPDMRULW\RIILJKWHUVVRXJKWWRGHIHQGWKHLUORFDOLWLHV)LJKWHUVH[SODLQ³+RZ>FRXOG@,
leave my city and people whom I worked with closely for many years, now that they are in danger"´
(Interview in Cherkezija 2003, 105, emphasis added); ³:HNQHZWKDWHYHU\village had to defend 
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LWVHOI´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO In the east of Abkhazia, local-level mobilization took form 
of village defense, prompted by threat framing in the local social structures.44 Spontaneous fighters 
FRQILUP³WKHAdministration was notified that the [Georgian] forces were [near] in Okhurej« That 
evening the whole village gathered« and organized village defense´ (Interview in Khodzhaa 2003, 
100, emphasis added); ³0\nephew«urged me to go WRWKHHDVW«ZKHUH it was very difficult due 
WRWKHEORFNDGH6RRQ,«ZDVLQP\native Mokva´,QWHUYLHZLQ.KRG]KDD 64, emphasis 
added). Village defense groups formed similarly in the west, but were complemented by shoreline 
patrols due to proximity to the sea.45 Fighters illustrate these forms of local mobilization: ³:KHQ
Georgians occupied Abkhazia, we immediately formed a Pitsunda group. We were 15 boys from 
the village«2WKHUVVWDUWHGWRMRLQ«:HRQO\KDGULIOHVDQGDJUHQDGHODXQFKHU« but guarded 
[our] bridges [IURPLQWUXVLRQ@´ (Interview 33, Pitsunda, Fall 2011); ³SHRSOHZLWKRXW weapons began 
organizing into groups in their villages to patrol the shoreline. Our [group] was in the school. We 
all knew each other and tried keeping close tRRQHDQRWKHU´,QWHUYLHZ3LWVXQGD)DOO 
 Finally, many Abkhaz left their localities to defend Sukhum/i and Gagra, the sites of utmost 
ILJKWLQJDWWKHZDURQVHW³<RXDUHPRVWGHDUWRPH´ a spontaneous fighter in the west explained to 
his wife, ³EXWP\ motherland is dearer´ (Interview 104, Sukhum/i, Fall 2011). A Tqvarchel/i fighter 
GHPRQVWUDWHV³P\\RXQJHUEURWKHUran away to [Sukhum/i] to fight for the Motherland together 
ZLWKKLV>65,)@IULHQGV´,QWHUYLHZLQ.KRG]KDD 2009, 736, emphasis added). As this fighter, many 
MRLQHGRUJDQL]HGPRELOL]DWLRQE\6XNKXPLDQG*DJUDRQFHWKUHDWZDVIUDPHGQDWLRQDOO\³:KHQ
Ardzinba announced JHQHUDOPRELOL]DWLRQ´ a Gudauta fighter reports, ³,VDLG µ(YHU\RQHJR to [the 
                                                 
44
 Groups of 15 to 215 fighters formed in at least 22 of around 35 villages (Pachulija 2010, 49-55). 
45
 Defense groups formed in almost every village in the Abkhaz-dominated Gudauta region, while shoreline patrols 
were as well present in the Gagra region, where the Abkhaz were a minority. 
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military KHDGTXDUWHUV@¶ They separated us into groups´ (Interview 97, Gagra, Fall 2011). The Gu-
dauta group of 140 fighters formed there assisted SRIF fighters by Sukhum/i (Pachulija 2010, 39).  
Yet most mobilized outside of the SRIF structure, gaining access to weapons at the Gudauta 
military base and among the locals or going unarmed. Fighters describe these typical mobilization 
scenarios: ³ZHgathered the boys ZHNQHZ«took some weapons from the Russian barracks (with 
VRPHWKH\KHOSHGRWKHUZHMXVWWRRN«>DQG@right away went with one bullet to >6XNKXPL¶V@ Red 
Bridge´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO ³(YHU\WKLQJZDVDUUDQJHGspontaneously« We collected 
weapons and those who managed to get these weapons ZHQWWRZDUG>*HRUJLD¶VPDULQHVE\*DJUD@ 
«2IFRXUVHWHQV>RIXV@ZKRJRWWKHZHDSRQVZHUHQRWHQRXJK´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO 
³>-@RLQLQJWKHDUPHGVWUXJJOHLQVSLWHRIWKHDSSDUHQWIXWLOLW\RIUHVLVWDQFH´LPSOLHVWKDW non-
instrumental motives coexisted with instrumental concerns in Abkhaz mobilization (Brojdo 2008, 
51). Certainly, status considerations played a role. A mother captures the importance of community 
VDQFWLRQLQJ³ERWKVRQVZHUHVLFNEXWERWK were not sent [to be treated in Moscow] not to be seen as 
traitors´,QWHUYLHZ6XNKXPL)DOO+RZHYHUWKe further individual threat perceptions 
and associated actions were directed toward the broader collectivity, the more possibility existed for 
normative motivations in mobilization decisions. Three indicators support these motivations.  
First, poorly armed and unarmed mobilization suggests that security seeking or expectation 
of rewards were not the primary drivers. Local mobilization in the areas where Georgia established 
control is a critical observation in this regard. Exemplary is the record of continuing poorly armed 
mobilization after *HRUJLD¶VIRUFHVEORFNDGHGYLOODJHVWRZQVDQGFLWLHV in the HDVW³RQWKH second 
day [after Adzuzhba was blockaded], the youth of the village began gathering, arming themselves 
with whatever they could: made bottles with incendiary mixtures, got ammonal from Tqvarcheli, 
DQGSXWXSDEDUULFDGH«ZLWKZDWFKGXWLHV´,QWHUYLHZLQ.KRG]DDHPSKDVLVDGGHG 
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Second, the record of human losses among the Abkhaz and continuing mobilization despite 
these losses, especially by Sukhum/i and Gagra, is a strong indicator of normative motivations. For 
H[DPSOHVSRQWDQHRXVILJKWHUV³WDNHQFDSWLYH>LQWKHILUVW6XNKXPLEDWWOH@ZHUHall brutally killed´
(Interview in Khodzhaa 2009, 888, emphasis added). Fighters learned about or observed casualties 
LQWKHILJKWLQJ\HWFRQWLQXHGWRILJKW$SDUWLFLSDQWLOOXVWUDWHVWKLVSDWWHUQE\6XNKXPL³ZKHQWKH
Abkhaz went into counterattack the first day of the war, one had a gun, two were unarmed, running 
EHKLQG«WRWDNHthe guns of >WKRVH@«injured or killed´,QWHUYLHZ6XNKXPL:LQWHU 
Third, mobilization despite the exit option reflects normative motives. As a fighter explains, 
³3HRSOHGLHGYROXQWDULO\IRU$ENKD]LDQRRQHIRUFHGWKHPWKH\could leave for RXVVLD´,QWHUYLHZ
127, Sukhum/i, Winter 2011). Not only escaping the fighting was generally feasible at the war onset 
(see section below), but also exit options existed for select groups. General mobilization exempted 
youths under 18 years old. Single sons and intellectuals were ordered not to fight. Many mobilized 
despite these alternatives and report duty-EDVHGPRWLYHV³>,@SHUIRUP>HG@ the duty to our people at 
DGLIILFXOWWLPH´D\RXQJILJKWHUVD\V,QWHUYLHZLQ%HELDHPSKDVLVDGGHG³,could not 
do otherwise in the situation of aggression against my ethnos´DSURIHVVRUH[SODLQV,QWHUYLHZ 117, 
Sukhum/i, Fall 2011).46 Combat deaths and injuries in these groups are systematically reported.47 
Non-Fighters: Fear and Self- and Kin-Protection  
WhiOHFROOHFWLYHWKUHDWIUDPLQJPDGHPRVWSRWHQWLDOSDUWLFLSDQWVDZDUHRI*HRUJLD¶VWKUHDW
the extent to which threat toward the broader group was prioritized differentiated fighters from non-
fighters. Fighters mobilized to defend their families, localities, and Abkhazia as a whole, moving 
toward the other-regarding end of the mobilization continuum in each scenario. Non-fighters, even 
                                                 
46
 Righteous from this perspective, the war forced up to 240,000 Georgians to flee Abkhazia (Trier et al. 2010, 21). 
47
 Interview 11, Pitsunda, Fall 2011; Interview 88, Gagra, Fall 2011; Interview 95, Gudauta, Fall 2011; Interview 144, 
Sukhum/i, Winter 2011. 
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if empathized with the cause, did not see their participation as meaningful in the unlikely conditions 
of Abkhaz success and hid, fled, or, in rare cases, defected to the Georgian side. Pursued for self- or 
kin-protection reasons, these actions were situated toward the self-regarding end of mobilization.  
Hiding was the dominant non-fighting strategy. Depending on who controlled their locality, 
non-fighters hid in their villages, towns, or cities or fled to safer areas in Abkhazia. These included 
Tqvarchel/i in the east and Gudauta in the west²³WKHRQO\DUHDVWKDWGLGQRWVXIIHU>IURPILJKWLQJ@´
(Interview 10, Gudauta, Fall 2011)³2YHUWKHFRXUVHRIDIHZZHHNVPRVW$ENKD]IOHG6XNKXPL´
to these safer areas (HRW 1995, 23). In the east, holding neutrality was possible until the Georgian 
forces entered villages under their control. Thereafter, non-fighters who hid in these villages fled to 
Tqvarchel/i and surroundings that were blockaded but inaccessible to the Georgian side. ³7TYDUFKDO
was occupied, but Georgians could not take it because of the partisan fighting in its nearby YLOODJHV´
(Interview 110, Sukhum/i, Fall 2011). A non-ILJKWHUUHSRUWVDXVXDOSDWWHUQLQWKHDUHD³2Q August 
16, the [M]khedrioni entered RXUYLOODJH7DP\VK«$ENKD]UHVLGHQWVZHUHIRUFHGWRsave ourselves 
by fleeing«WKURXJKYLOODJHV«WRTqvarcheli´/HWWHULQ&KHUNH]LMD, emphasis added). In 
the west, the Abkhaz-controlled Gudauta region served as the hiding area. The Georgian roadblocks 
were set up, but were lenient at the war onset. A non-ILJKWHUIURP*DJUDUHSRUWV³7KHUHZDVDpost 
LQ.RONKLGD« 7KH\VLIWHG« WKH$ENKD]« but still looked through the fingers« My relative came 
to take his sister and children [and we fled] to the Gudauta UHJLRQ´,QWHUYLHZ 83, Gagra, Fall 2011).  
The second widespread non-fighting strategy was fleeing outside of Abkhazia. In the east, a 
helicopter from Tqvarchel/i fleZWR5XVVLDQ7HEHUGD³0\KXVEDQG>DQGVRQZHUHLQWKHHDVW@ went 
WR«7TYDUFKDOWKURXJKQRQ-RFFXSLHGDUHD«IURPWKHUHE\helicopter to Teberda´,QWHUYLHZ
Gagra, Fall 2011). Access to this option was difficult, especially for men, most of whom hid instead. 
In the west, individuals fled to Russia by sea or main road. A non-fighter describes these scenarios: 
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³Dboat carried all those who wanted to leave IURP*XGDXWDWR6RFKL«PDQ\left by cars«>7@KHUH
had been tens [already in Russia] whHQZHDUULYHG>E\ERDW@´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO48 
Finally, a small number of individuals defected to the Georgian side. Respondents critically 
VD\³7KHUHZHUHDOVR others who went to fight on the other side´,QWHUYLHZ 5, Gudauta, Fall 2011). 
The defectors are known by name, as traitors, and often come from the organized pool of potential 
mobilizers (Pachulija 2010, 32-3). The Georgian leadership admitted after the war that the Abkhaz 
population rarely supported them (Kvarandzija, 1996). Thus, of under 100 SRIF regulars, only two 
fled and three defected (Khodzhaa 2006, 190-2UJDQL]HGILJKWHUVLOOXVWUDWHWKLVGHFLVLRQ³ZKHQ
the Georgian WDQNDSSURDFKHGRXUEDWWDOLRQFRPPDQGHU«RUGHUHGSHUVRQQHOWRVWDQGULJKWEHIRUH
WKHWDQN«>DQG@disappeared´,QWHUYLHZ in Khodzhaa 2006, 58, emphasis added).  
The actions of individuals in the non-fighter trajectory indicate that they perceived personal 
or kin security to be at greatest threat. The underlying theme of fear for own life or close family and 
friends supports their security-based motives. As non-ILJKWHUVFRQVLVWHQWO\H[SODLQ³,ZDVafraid«
[and so] went to Gudauta and hid. There was fear for your life and your close ones« We could be 
killed any time´,QWHUYLHZ6XNKXPL:LQWHU³:HZHUe in fear, we could have died«
,QRZUHJUHW,WZRXOGKDYHEHHQEHWWHULI,KDGJRQHWRILJKW´,QWHUYLHZ3LWVXQGD)DOO49 
³7KH$ENKD]SRSXODWLRQWKXVOLYHGLQWHUURU´DQGHVFDSHGWRSURWHFWWKHPVHOYHV+5: 23). 
Depending on whether they escaped the fighting on the Abkhaz side together with family 
and friends or alone, the non-fighter roles moved toward the self-regarding end of the mobilization 
continuum. The actions of those who hid, fled, or defected alone strongly align with self-regarding 
PRWLYHVDVWKH\FRPPRQO\FRPSURPLVHGRWKHUV$VRUJDQL]HGILJKWHUVUHFRXQWWKHLUFRPPDQGHU¶V
                                                 
48
 5XVVLD¶VIOHHWHYDFXDWHGDURXQGSHRSOHIURP$ENKD]LDE\$XJXVW+5: 
49
 Regret is evident in my participant observation as rumors surround non-fighters (Field notes, November 4, 2011).  
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GHIHFWLRQ³RXUGHSXW\FRPPDQGHU«betrayed us, giving in SDUWRIRXUSHUVRQQHO´ (Interview in 
Khodzhaa 2003, 45, emphasis added). Parents driven by fear hid the sons for others to fight instead:  
P\VRQZDV>LQWKH*XGDXWDEDUUDFNV@+HGLGQRWOLNHLW³,DP\HDUVROGWKHZDULV
RQJRLQJEXW,DPOD\LQJKHUH«´,WROGKLP³6WD\«OLNHHYHU\RQH´>0DQ\@hid their sons 
WKHUH«If volunteers came, they were taken to fight. These ones were not volunteers, so 
they remained [in the reserve] and lived (Interview 11, Pitsunda, Fall 2011). 
Those who escaped together prioritized security of close family and friends, even when this 
posed difficult dilemmas of mobilization. Non-fighters report: ³:HKDGno doubt that we could not 
stay in Abkhazia [due to] casualties«0\KXVEDQG [took me] with children WR0DMNRS´,QWHUYLHZ
59, Gagra, Fall 2011); ³P\PRWKHU-in-ODZ«WROGKHUVRQµ7DNH\RXUchildJRWR7NXDUFKDO¶ [My 
husband] was a 40-year-ROGPDQ>DEOHWRILJKWEXW@«KDGWRWDNH>RXUVRQ@EHFDXVHotherwise they 
would be killed´,QWHUYLHZ*DJUD)DOO³,did not want to, but was persuaded«WRWDNH
the children DZD\IURPWKHYLOODJH«WR0RVFRZ´,QWHUYLHZ3LWsunda, Fall 2011).  
Family and other alternative obligations formed through inter-marriage or employment and 
HGXFDWLRQRXWVLGHRI$ENKD]LDRYHUZKHOPHGWKHVHLQGLYLGXDOV¶GXW\WRWKHEURDGHUFROOHFWLYLW\$V
UHVSRQGHQWVH[SODLQ³0\EURWKHU¶Vwife was Georgian«7KH\ZHQWWR0RVFRZDVVRRQDV the war 
EHJDQ´,QWHUYLHZ*XGDXWD )DOO³$VDSDUHQWLWLVQRW the state that punishes my son, but I 
« There is a notion of shame here, of which there is none in Moscow [where many went to study or 
ZRUN@´,QWerview 122, Sukhum/i, Fall 2011). As a result, fighters mobilized driven by the duty to 
their collectivity at the quotidian, local, and national levels, which they perceived to be threatened. 
Non-fighters feared for their own or kin security. Self- or kin-protection was their primary concern, 
reflected in their decisions to hide, flee, or defect, alone or together with close family and friends. 
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CONCLUSION 
Using local-level data on Abkhaz mobilization at the onset of the Georgian-Abkhaz war in 
mid-August, 1992, this article argued that social structures, within which individuals are embedded, 
provide access to essential information on threat that individuals draw on to make difficult mobili-
zation decisions in the context of uncertainty characteristic of civil war. This information is filtered 
from the national through local levels of society and is consolidated into collective notions of threat 
with quotidian networks based on shared understandings of history and identity. The emergence of 
collective notions of threat shapes the ways in which individuals view threat. The difference in self- 
to other-regarding roles that individuals adopt is based on who the other is in their threat perception. 
Framed as threatening across social structures in Abkhazia, the Georgian advance prompted 
mobilization by both armed and poorly armed or unarmed fighters, even in the areas where Georgia 
established control. Those whose understanding of conflict resonated with collective threat framing 
perceived threat to their collectivity and mobilized to defend families, localities, and the nation. The 
further their actions concerned the broader group, the more they reflected normative commitments 
beyond self-regarding concerns, as their group²outnumbered and militarily weak at the war onset 
²offered little prospect of security or success in the war. Others prioritized threat to themselves or 
close family and friends and hid, fled, or defected to the stronger, Georgian side. Whether they esca-
ped the fighting alone or together reflected the self- or kin-protection motives behind their actions.  
The implication of this analysis is that distinct mobilization trajectories cannot be viewed as 
a result of stable preferences or cost-benefit calculations based on pre-existing knowledge of threat. 
While these considerations play a role, they are situated in a complex social context, where threats 
are not given, but are rather constructed, or filtered through and consolidated by the social structures 
that individuals interact with in daily life, and the resultant perception, rather than the fact of threat, 
drives individual mobilization decisions. This article relates the differences in threat perception to 
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lived experiences as part of the group and suggests that alternative group obligations influence the 
ways in which individuals process the information on threat. Future research should focus greater 
attention on how social structures interact with instrumental and normative motives in shaping 
mobilization across a broader range of micro-level variation in combatant, support, and non-fighter 
roles as they relate to collectivities at their different levels of aggregation. This research can gain 
further insight into the coexistence of instrumental and normative motivations and specific mecha-
nisms of other-regarding mobilization²a novel and promising area of research on individual deci-
sion-making in civil war. 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS  
 The primary data on which this article is based was collected in Abkhazia over 2010-2013. 
The main source of data are 150 interviews conducted with 142 respondents selected according to 
location and participation in the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-1993²the two sources of variation 
in my micro-comparative research design. This methodological appendix provides a description of 
the manner in which the interviews were conducted, including my fieldwork logistics and interview 
strategies. 
Fieldwork Logistics 
 My research in Abkhazia began with an exploratory field trip, when I probed the feasibility 
of long-term engagement in the selected sub-national locales, the ability to locate respondents with 
the varied record of participation in the Georgian-Abkhaz war, and SHRSOH¶VRSHQQHVVWRGLVFXVVLQJ
topics related to war participation, life events outside of the war period, and the conflict in general. 
This preliminary trip focused on establishing contacts in the non-governmental sector, government 
structures of the de facto Abkhaz state,1 and local community groups. I identified key state and non-
state organizations and held informal meetings with the leaders. The trip was essential in testing my 
initial assumptions about the case and refining my research design, developing trust among leading 
actors in the Abkhaz society and visibility on which my future research depended, and assessing the 
security issues I could encounter during long-term fieldwork in Abkhazia (Sluka 2012). 
 The insight I gained in the exploratory stage of my research guided my core field trip, when 
I spent close to a month in each of the four field sites²Sukhum/i, Gagra, Pitsunda, and Gudauta. In 
particular, it was important for me to remain unaffiliated during my field research: in the politicized 
                                                 
1
 Abkhazia is a partially recognized, breakaway territory of Georgia. 
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Abkhaz environment, formal affiliation with any one organization can be perceived as acceding to 
WKDWRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKHFRQIOLFW2 Hence, I worked independently and relied on my local 
contacts, rather than official bodies, non-governmental organizations, or universities, for logistical 
VXSSRUW7KLVVWUDWHJ\KHOSHG³GLVSHOWKHQRWLRQWKDW>,ZDV@DIILOLDWHGZLWKJRYHUQPHQWDJHQFLHV [or 
civil society opposition], a frequent fear of the residents of high-vLROHQFHORFDOHV´ (Arias 2009, 245). 
In entering each field site, I followed two steps to attain confidence of potential respondents 
and personal security. First, I introduced myself to the local authorities, including the heads of local 
administrations and the police (milicija) office. Formal approval implied that my research purposes 
were known and that respondents would not bear reprisals for participation from the state. Second, 
I drew on networks I established in the preliminary trip to contact prominent community members 
who served as gatekeepers for me LQHDFKORFDOHLGHQWLILHGP\ILUVWUHVSRQGHQWVDQGFRXOG³YRXFK
for [my] lHJLWLPDF\´3HULWRUH%RWKVWUDWHJLHVUHDVVXUHGUHVSRQGHQWVRIP\UHVHDUFKHU
role²the impression critical for increasing trust and addressing security concerns in violent social 
contexts (Sluka 1990). 
My sustained presence, consistency of research activities, and engagement in UHVSRQGHQWV¶ 
daily lives and formal and informal social events allowed me to extend my initial networks in each 
locale to include a broad range of local contacts, on which I drew to select subsequent respondents. 
7KHVHFRQWDFWVRULJLQDWHGLQUHVSRQGHQWV¶H[WHQGHGVRFLDOQHWZRUNV,LQWHUDFWHGZLWKRXWVLGHRI the 
interview setting and war-related associations, libraries, and museums, where I collected secondary 
PDWHULDOV+HQFHIROORZLQJRWKHUUHVHDUFKHUVRIYLROHQFH³I did not rely on any single person as an 
interlocutor or any single network of relations«WRDYRLGSHUVRQDOELDVHV´)XMLL).  
                                                 
2
 This strategy of preventing research bias is unfeasible in many conflict settings (Wood 2006, 379).  
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Furthermore, when my networks did not provide the contacts needed to fulfill the spectrum 
of war participation roles, I approached those individuals highlighted in my interviews, secondary 
research, and informal interactions without referral. Field awareness I developed over the course of 
my work helped evaluate when this strategy was ethical and would not harm respondents, namely, 
in cases of official posts, and how to appropriately implement it²through formal appointments. 
The interviews with potential respondents, selected through my combined network referral 
and targeted selection strategy, were generally arranged by phone, with respondents themselves or 
their office representatives, when I introduced myself, briefly described my research, and asked if 
they were comfortable with an interview. One woman and three men in fighter and non-fighter roles 
UHIXVHGWRSDUWLFLSDWHZKLFKLQGLFDWHGWKDW³SHRSOHGLGQRWIHHOSUHVVXUHGWRWDON´)XMLL 574). 
Following a refusal, I sought other respondents with similar participation status. 
7KHLQWHUYLHZVW\SLFDOO\WRRNSODFHLQUHVSRQGHQWV¶KRPHVRIILFHVRUSXEOLFDUHDVVXFKDV
parks and cafes, where distance from others and privacy of the interview could be ensured. I asked 
respondents for a preferred location, but suggested alternative options if I felt that the location may 
compromise confidentiality or security of respondents or myself. My ability to assess these factors 
increased over time; in general, I trusted the local knowledge of my respondents (Wood 2006, 380). 
Since the interviews were clustered within each locale I lived in at a time, my access to the 
interview location was relatively easy. I used public forms of transportation, mostly traveling alone, 
EXWLQUDUHFDVHVZKHQDIRUPDOLQWURGXFWLRQZDVQHFHVVDU\RUUHVSRQGHQWV¶UHVLGHQFHZDVRXWVLGH
of the public transportation service area, was accompanied by an interlocutor. Due to the relatively 
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small size of Abkhazia,3 I was not obstructed in my movement between the locales, but had to limit 
my movement to the selected locales for security reasons.4 
I conducted the interviews in Russian, a language spoken by all respondents in my research, 
and did not require translation or other types of assistance. The interviews lasted one to six hours, 
averaging two hours. Most were recorded (see consent details below) and transcribed upon return.5 
When recording during the interview hindered the conversation, I reconstructed the interview in my 
field notes immediately after. No respondent refused interview recording. However, when I judged 
that it could jeopardize respondents or myself, the interview was not recorded in any form.6 Finally, 
respondents were not compensated for participation and, in turn, often offered to share a meal after 
the interview²an important indicator that my research was seen as valuable by my respondents. 
In the course of my field research, I took great care in ensuring privacy, confidentiality, and 
security of my respondents in the interview as well as protecting the sensitive data I collected, both 
in the field and writing stages (Wood 2006; Fujii 2012). In the field, the interview recordings were 
kept in a secure, password-protected location, with the field notes carried with me at all times. My 
transcribed materials and field notes are not made publicly available as they were collected under 
assurances of confidentiality and remain sensitive materials in light of the ongoing tensions around 
Abkhazia. I present interview excerpts without attribution or personal identifiers and in the context 
of typical war participation trajectories, rather than individual details. These strategies protect my 
respondents in an ongoing way. 
                                                 
3
 The area is 8,700km2 over 170km along the coast and 66km from south to north (Dbar 2013, 23). 
4
 For example, I avoided the bordering regions between Abkhazia and Georgia due to the continued 
violent activity there.  
5
 This strategy is feasible in some field contexts (see, for example, Viterna 2006), but is avoided in 
others for security reasons (see, for example, Parkinson 2013, 420).  
6
 This decision was made in exceptional cases of respondents with a sensitive public profile.  
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Interview Strategies  
 The interviews followed the semi-structured format, beginning with the thorough informed 
consent protocol and, only once respondents communicated their full consent, proceeding to semi-
structured interview questions on pre-war, civil war, and post-war aspects of the Georgian-Abkhaz 
conflict. The informed consent procedure was typically written for high-level government officials 
and leaders of non-governmental organizations and oral for all other individuals. The written option 
was offered to individuals in the noted positions due to their public profile and extensive exposure 
to academic and media interviewing. These respondents often requested me to note their affiliation 
and post in the interview record and presentation. However, their names are not used in writing and 
their consent forms are not made publicly available. I stressed at the outset of the consent procedure 
that the oral option could be taken at any time in the interview.7 The majority of respondents in my 
research consented to be interviewed orally, so that no written record of their participation existed 
or could compromise their identity. 
The informed consent procedure followed the same protocol regardless of the distinction in 
the written and oral form. I introduced myself as an academic researcher completing a Ph.D. degree 
in Canada. I ensured to make it clear early in the interview that I did not have an affiliation with the 
government, non-governmental organizations, or universities in Abkhazia, Georgia, or Russia²the 
main actors involved in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. However, I emphasized that I gained formal 
approval from the local authorities to conduct my research in the locale where the interview took 
place. I noticed that this self-presentation format put individuals at ease, as I was not seen as biased 
                                                 
7
 No potential respondent in my research refused the written option. In contrast, respondents in this 
group often preferred written informed consent. It is a common practice of elite interviewing in the 
post-war context of Abkhazia and the region more broadly. However, this option is not advisable in 
the context of ongoing civil wars (Wood 2006, 380).  
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by the formal affiliation with political actors in the conflict and took care to secure the local approval 
viewed as important by most potential respondents. 
In-depth examination of the history of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was the stated purpose 
of my research. I made sure to clarify that I would consult with a broad range of actors involved in 
the conflict, including individuals who participated in different capacities and did not participate in 
the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-1993 and individuals with different affiliations and positions in 
present-day Abkhazia. I informed potential respondents that while my research focused on conflict 
processes that have developed in Abkhazia, I would conduct further research in Georgia and Russia 
to incorporate the views on the history of the conflict on all sides. Making my research purpose and 
scope transparent was important in general, but especially for those individuals who did not wish to 
participate in a project that involved the views of the actors they did not accept. While no individual 
refused to participate on these grounds, this information was central to a fully informed consent. 
Finally, I assured potential respondents that I would maintain their confidentiality across all 
stages of research and that their responses would be excerpted in my writing, without attribution or 
identifying details. This applied to all potential respondents, including the government officials and 
non-governmental leaders noted above, unless they specifically requested their affiliation and post 
to be recorded.8 I made it clear that no other benefits than academic writing based on the collected 
materials should be expected from my research. I followed Wood (2006, 380) in offering ³GLIIHUHQW
OHYHOVRIFRQILGHQWLDOLW\´ to individuals, with the options to withdraw written or oral consent at any 
time, control what I recorded during or after the interview, and refuse to answer any of my questions. 
Combined, this protocol helped shape a full understanding of the interview process and outcomes 
                                                 
8
 Even in these cases, I am careful not to include individual details in my writing and to note these 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶ positions mainly in the discussion of present-day issues and general conflict processes.  
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and the interview dynamics where respondents could contribute to the conversation on their terms.9 
This approach appears to have prevented some of the distress that could otherwise be experienced 
in interviews on traumatic, conflict-related topics. 
The remainder of the interview was based on the principles of in-depth interviewing within 
the interpretive research tradition.10 7KLVPHWKRG³LVLQWHQGHGWRH[SORUHWKHPHDQLQJVRI terms 
DQGRUVLWXDWLRQVDQGRUHYHQWV«WRWKHSHUVRQVZKR live wiWKDQGRUOLYHGWKURXJKWKHP´<DQRZ 
and Schwartz-Shea 2006, 118). I selected this method because the core goal of my research was to 
explore the meanings Abkhaz men and women attributed to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict from the 
historical perspective, with their pre-war commitments, social interaction, and conflict participation 
setting the ground for understanding their perceptions of conflict at the war onset and mobilization 
WUDMHFWRULHV7KHVHXQGHUVWXGLHGTXHVWLRQVDUH³GLIILFXOWWRORFDWHLQGRFXPHQWDry sources or every-
GD\LQWHUDFWLRQV´6RVV6, 141). In-depth interviewing allowed me to explore these questions in 
great detail and with the level of flexibility necessary to delve into the dilemmas and uncertainties 
surrounding mobilization decisions and the relationship between structure and agency in civil war.  
What made the interviews in-depth was the discursive mode of interaction I adopted with 
UHVSRQGHQWV³µ&RQYHUVDWLRQ¶FRPHVFORVH to capturing the character of interviewing in an interpre-
tive PRGH´<DQRZ and Schwartz-Shea 2006, 117). Hence, after the formal informed consent part 
of the interview, I suggested to my respondents that the interaction to follow was best viewed as a 
conversation. This removed the sense RILQWHUURJDWLRQWKDWFRXOGEHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHWHUP³LQWHU-
                                                 
9
 See Thomson (2010) on the importance of engaging individuals on their own terms. This approach 
is especially critical in interviewing people on sensitive issues involving personal suffering or loss.  
10
 While my interviews were semi-structured, rather than fully open-ended²the format commonly 
associated with interpretive interviewing,²they nonetheless had a discursive, as opposed to fixed, 
format, distinguishing my approach from surveys and preset formal interviews (Soss 2006, 135). 
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YLHZ´ and implied that my questions would be used to guide, rather than determine, the course of 
the interview. My role in the interview was defined as that of an engaged, focused listener.11 The 
semi-structured interview plan served to navigate and direct the conversation toward my research 
purpose, while I was open to and followed up on respondent departures from my questions.12  
This discursive interview dynamic ³DOORZ>HG@WKHUHVSRQGHQW to reflect on and even explore 
her own ideas, to reveal not only strong views but also worries, uncertainties²in a word, to engage 
KXPDQYXOQHUDELOLW\´(Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, 118). It was essential to capturing personal 
views beyond the master narrative of conflict. Respondents often began with the official narrative, 
but revealed their nuanced positions in specific stories, silences, and physical gestures in the course 
of WKHLQWHUYLHZ7KHVH³VSRNHQDQGXQVSRNHQ´LQWHUDFWLRQVVLJQDOLQJUHVSRQGHQWV¶³WKRXJKWVDQG 
IHHOLQJV´ exemplify the ³PHWD-data´ that I paid close attention to and engaged in my research (Fujii 
2010, 232). )RUH[DPSOHWKHVLOHQFHVIROORZLQJZRPHQ¶VDFFRXQWVRQZDUSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIIDWKHUV
brothers, sons, and husbands indicated that retelling of the stories of bravery and goodness of these 
Abkhaz fighters was a way of coping with their loss. As demonstrated below, the meta-data served 
as an invaluable source of insight for me to probe and reconstruct individual understandings of 
conflict and mobilization trajectories, both within and across the interviews. 
My semi-structured interview plan followed the individual life histories in the context of the 
conflict.13 7KHTXHVWLRQVRQUHVSRQGHQWV¶ childhood focused on the stories respondents remembered 
                                                 
11
 The intimate setting produced by this approach allowed me to share in the memories of the war 
and experience of remembering. It invited me to reflect on my emotional reactions to respondents, 
both in and outside of the interview setting. See Wood (2006, RQ³VHFRQGDU\WUDXPD´ among 
researchers conducting interviews on war. See Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006) on reflexivity. 
12
 The length of my interviews varied largely for this reason.  
13
 7KHLQWHUYLHZVWRRNWKHOLIHKLVWRU\IRUPDW³DIRUPRIRUDOKLVWRU\´LQWHUYLHZLQJVXLWDEOH to my 
research due to its scope, covering life trajectories, rather than focusing on singular topics or events 
%HQPD\RUIQS:KLOHRUDOKLVWRU\³UHIHUVWR« recording, transcribing, editing, and 
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hearing within the family and outside of the household, the relations they developed with Georgian 
neighbors, teachers, and classmates, and the language they had to speak and history they learned at 
school²Abkhaz, Georgian, and/or Russian. These questions helped me examine whether and how 
the attitudes on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict were formed within the structure of familial or other 
everyday social relations and reinforced at the national level, for instance, through education policy. 
The next phase of the interview plan covered pre-war adulthood, focusing on the university 
experience, which most of my respondents had due to the Soviet emphasis on higher education, the 
Georgian-Abkhaz relations in the employment setting, and involvement in pre-war mobilization.14 
I interviewed individuals with a broad range of pre-war backgrounds, which allowed me to capture 
how respondents in the distinct state and non-state positions thought their group belonging affected 
education and employment opportunities. The sites of information exchange, affiliation formation, 
and organization of collective action were discussed in this phase of the interview, letting me probe 
WKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQUHVSRQGHQWV¶GLIIHUHQWSUH-war commitments and organizational affiliation 
and their activism. At this stage in their life histories, respondents were likely to form strong extra-
familial relationships within and outside of the Abkhaz group, making this phase of the interview 
central to gathering egocentric social network data.15 This data emerged from respondent accounts 
of who they interacted with and what interactions shaped their views and participation in pre-war 
conflict events. It ZDVFROOHFWHGDFURVVWKHLQWHUYLHZVDVUHVSRQGHQWV¶UHODWLRQVKLSVRYHUODSSHG16 
                                                 
making public the UHVXOWLQJSURGXFW´ an important departure in my research was not to edit or make 
transcripts available publicly to ensure security of respondents (Gluck and Patai 1991, fn. 1, p. 4). 
14
 My respondents fell in two general age groups, young adults under the age of 30 prior to the war 
and individuals over 30 years old, most of whom had stable employment and families at that time.  
15
 Parkinson (2013) adopts a similar strategy.  
16
 Respondents often attended the same university and met in the employment context. I purposely 
VHOHFWHGUHVSRQGHQWV¶IDPLO\PHPEHUVDQGIULHQGVZLWKYDULHGZDUSDUWLFLSDWLRQUHFRUGWRFDSWXUH
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The majority of the interview focused specifically on the first days of the Georgian-Abkhaz 
war of 1992-1993.17 I followed the strategy that combined questions on the events that unfolded on 
August 14-LQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VWUDMHFWRU\DQGPRUHEURDGO\LQWKHWUDMHFWRULHVRIIDPLOLHV
IULHQGVDQGDFTXDLQWDQFHVDQGSURFHHGHGWRQDUUDWLYHTXHVWLRQVRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of these events.18 Existing research in pV\FKRORJ\DQGVRFLDO VFLHQFHVGHPRQVWUDWHV³WKDWPRUH
VDOLHQWOHVVUHSHWLWLYHHYHQWVDUHUHPHPEHUHGZLWKSDUWLFXODUDFFXUDF\« and that highly intense or 
YLROHQWHYHQWV«DUHHVSHFLDOO\ZHOOUHPHPEHUHGLQERWKWKHVKRUWDQGORQJWHUP´9LWHUQD
14; Wood 2003, 33-4). Since these features characterized the war onset in Abkhazia, I was able to 
draw RQWKHUHFROOHFWLRQVRIUHVSRQGHQWVWRUHFRQVWUXFWHDFKUHVSRQGHQW¶V step by step mobilization 
trajectory, exploring how they learned about the Georgian advance into Abkhazia, who they talked 
to upon hearing the news of the advance, and what actions and with whom they pursued in response.  
I then proceeded to ask DERXWUHVSRQGHQWV¶ views on the war onset, including whether they 
anticipated the Georgian advance, how they perceived the anticipated risks associated with it, and 
what motivated them to participate in the war or not and in which capacity. The result is the highly 
nuanced collection of individual mobilization trajectories, with the sequences of individual actions 
situated within the broader structural context of the war onset and the social ties involved, as well as 
the narratives describing perceptions and motivations as they related to pre-war accounts of family 
past, personal relations in and outside of the group, and engagement in the conflict before the war.  
                                                 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶VRFLDOUHODWLRQVDQGZKHWKHUDQGKRZWKHVHUHODWLRQVSHUVLVWHGLQWKHZDU$V I gathered 
data on multiple such networks, the interviews did not privilege certain views or affiliations. 
17
 The Georgian advance took place on August 14-15, 1992. I focused on these two days to evaluate 
the differences in mobilization in the east, which unfolded on August 14, and west of Abkhazia the 
following day. I incorporated August 16-18 into the discussion of the war onset to establish whether 
respondents changed their mobilization decisions after exposure to the first episodes of violence. 
18
 Viterna (2006, 14) adopts a similar VWUDWHJ\RI³>P@L[LQJWKHUHFDOORIHYents with more open-
ended narrative questions.´ 
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While the combination of event and narrative accounts helped me tackle the subject of war 
onset from different angles and so address the issue of memory in this core phase of the interview,19 
the last phases of the interview on further war and post-war stages allowed me to evaluate, first, the 
endogeneity of respondent memories to war-time processes and, second, whether and how SHRSOH¶V
post-war affiliations affected what they said about the past (Wood 2003). On the first issue, Wood 
(2003, 35) DUJXHVWKDW³WKHWHOOLQJRISHUVRQDODQGFRPPXQLW\KLVWRULHVLQDQHWKQRJUDSKLFVHWWLQg is 
«VKDSHGE\WKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VSHUVRQDODQGIDPLO\WUDMHFWRULHVWKURXJKWKHZDU´,HPSOR\HGWKUHH
strategies to address this issue. First, I paid close attention to how respondents spoke about their war 
trajectories in relation to their family members and close friends. This strategy allowed me to check 
when respondent accounts conveyed self-aggrandizing or, in contrast, minimizing motives, rather 
than actual patterns of mobilization. For example, female respondents often spoke on behalf of men 
who fought and were lost in the war. Their war-time paths were cast in relation to men. This insight 
helped me steer the intervieZWRZDUGZRPHQ¶VVSHFLILF activities in support or other war-time roles.  
Second, I recorded the occurrence of silences and gestures indicating discomfort and noted 
in the course of the interview when the information provided by the respondent conflicted with my 
prior knowledge of the case or their mobilization record, as gathered from their preceding responses 
and RWKHUUHVSRQGHQWV¶ accounts and interactions. I was careful not to challenge what appeared to be 
misrepresented information for ethical and SUDFWLFDOUHDVRQV7KLVFRXOG³UHVXOW in hostility toward 
the project DQGSHUKDSVWRZDUGSDUWLFLSDQWV´:RRG 382).20 Instead, the semi-structured for-
mat of the interview ³SURYLGH>d me with] freedom for probes and follow-up TXHVWLRQV´ and I used 
targeted follow-up questions to cross-check responses within and across the interviews (Soss 2006, 
                                                 
19
 My interviews took place two decades after the Georgian-Abkhaz war. See Wood (2003), Fujii 
(2010), and Wedeen (2010) on problems of memory in conflict- and violence-related interviewing.  
20
 Researchers often face this dilemma, especially in perpetrator interviews (Wood 2006, 382). 
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135).21 For example, the rumors (see Appendix B. Participant Observation Sites, p. 17) surrounding 
individuals who did not participate in the combat or support roles in Abkhazia, but insisted that they 
contributed to the war, allowed me to grasp difficult dilemmas of war participation in the interview, 
including the different normative commitments in the decisions to participate in the war or not and 
the blame individuals had to bear thereafter if their decisions departed from the social expectations. 
Finally, I accessed comparable interview archives collected by other researchers at the time 
of the war in 1992-1993 and midway between the war and my field research.22 This strategy helped 
me assess how war-time processes shaped respondent memories and whether these memories were 
reshaped with time by validating mobilization trajectories and narratives surrounding the war²the 
two components of my combined event and narrative interview strategy. In particular, some of my 
respondents were interviewed by other researchers, allowing me to compare individual paths. The 
confirmation of mobilization trajectories that emerged using this strategy increased the confidence 
in my interview responses. More importantly, by using this strategy, I was able to verify the broader 
patterns I arrived at as a result of my research. Both my interviews and alternative archives support 
the importance of threat framing across social structures and shared understandings of history and 
identity based on the so-called Georgianization of Abkhazia underlying this threat framing.  
Triangulation with additional primary and secondary materials provided an additional level 
of validation. My extensive review of local academic studies, official documents, and news reports 
supplemented individual accounts on mobilization with macro-level data on the war, which further 
                                                 
21
 Fujii (2008) follows a similar strategy of cross-checking interview responses with meta-data. 
22
 In using this strategy, I drew on Scott (1985, 90), whose requirement for research locale selection 
wDV³WKDWWKHYLOODJHEHRQHWKDW had been studied before.´ The main sources of published interview 
transcripts on my case include Bebia (1997, 2011) and Khodzhaa (2003, 2006, 2009). Brojdo (2008) 
is based on interviews conducted during the war and offers base-line information for my research. 
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situated my interview data in the socio-structural context.23 My elite interviews and interviews 
with respondents affected by the conflict in Georgia and Russia closed the remaining gaps in the 
structural context of the war.24 
Beyond the strategies I adopted to engage the issue of memory, I was aware of the potential 
effects of post-war processes in Abkhazia on the interview. As Wood (2003, 35) suggests³SUHVHQW
political loyalties, beliefs concerning the likely consequences of participation in the interview and 
of expressing particular views, DQGSUHVHQWSHUVRQDOREMHFWLYHV´ influence what respondents choose 
to tell the researcher or not. As demonstrated above, I paid close attention in the informed consent 
procedure to conveying that respondent confidentiality would be preserved, that participation in the 
interview did not conflict with local authorities, and that no participation benefits existed other than 
academic writing. The protocol and respondent flexibility in the interview helped ease the concerns 
about voicing personal views. Respondents often spoke critically of the official conflict narrative 
and present-day politics in Abkhazia. My unaffiliated status in the region suggested that I did not 
KDYHSROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFHDQGP\UHVHDUFKZRXOGQRWDGYDQFHUHVSRQGHQWV¶SROLWLFDOSXUSRVHV0RVW 
respondents worked to present their stories in as much detail as possible, using personal documents, 
photographs, and notes to support their accounts.25 As other researchers of conflict, I realized that 
IRUPDQ\UHVSRQGHQWV³sharing their life story with an engaged listener [eager to comprehend their 
history] ZDVVRPHVRUWRIVHUYLFHWKDW,SURYLGHGLQWKHFRXUVHRIP\UHVHDUFK´:RRG.  
                                                 
23
 I surveyed major archives, libraries, and museums in Abkhazia (Sukhum/i, Gagra, and Gudauta), 
Georgia (Tbilisi), and Russia (Moscow) to locate official documents, secondary literature, and news 
archives on the conflict. See list of secondary materials appended as Table 5 (p. 29). 
24
 I conducted 30 interviews with former Georgian residents of Abkhazia displaced as a result of the 
war and elite interviews with experts on the conflict in Georgia (Tbilisi) and Russia (Moscow). See 
interview details appended as Table 6 (p. 30). 
25
 I did not request, but was frequently presented with supporting materials during the interviews. 
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Furthermore, to evaluate the extent to which post-war loyalties impacted the interviews and 
ensure that I did not privilege a single set of views on the war, I interviewed individuals with varied 
political affiliation in post-war Abkhazia. I expected that individuals disillusioned by the outcomes 
of the war, including the dire economic conditions and blockade of Abkhazia that followed, would 
not speak positively of the Abkhaz war effort. On the other hand, individuals who fought in the war 
and received high regard or leadership posts in the de facto Abkhaz state would be favorable toward 
it. To capture such differences, I interviewed state officials in local administration and police office 
and national ministries, including justice, defense, and foreign affairs. Respondents in the non-state 
group included leaders of non-governmental organizations, journalists, community leaders, such as 
the elders, and regular men and women. I noted how individuals in these distinct post-war positions 
spoke about the war and their participation. While ideological differences existed, the mobilization 
trajectories that emerged from the interviews, namely organized fighters, spontaneous fighters, and 
non-fighters, were represented across the post-war political divides. This suggests that present-day 
affiliation cannot explain the presented data. However, the pattern of how individuals learned about 
and decided to respond to the Georgian advance and the distinct motivations behind the trajectories 
were repeated across the interviews, with minor differences shaped by situational factors.26  
APPENDIX B. PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION SITES 
 Participant observation as a data collection method supplemented my in-depth interviews.27 
In each of my research locales, I engaged in ³SDUWLFLSDWLQJ in the daily life of the community through 
ordinary conversation and interaction; observing events (meetings, ceremonies, rituals«>DQG@
recording data in field notes´Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004, 267). The two methods went hand 
                                                 
26
 I stopped interviewing in each locale when respondents repeated the information I had received. 
27
 See Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006), Schatz (2009), and Wedeen (2010) on combining the two.  
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in hand in developing insight and focusing my research on insider perspectives, what Schatz (2009) 
FDOOV³HWKQRJUDSKLFVHQVLELOLW\´,RXWOLQHGDERYHP\XVHRISDUWLFLSDQWREVHUYDWLRQLQWKLVUHVHDUFK
as a way to situate respondents and what they reported in the interview setting within their war-time 
and present-day social context. This brief appendix describes my sites of participant observation. 
First, I attended all national and local-level events related to the war I was aware of during 
my fieldwork in Abkhazia. These events included medal award ceremonies, memorial gatherings, 
and celebrations of the Abkhaz victory in the war. During the events, I recoded notes on the content 
of presented speeches and remarks, gestures, and facial expressions in the audience. Observation at 
these events helped better grasp the official conflict narrative and the ways in which individuals in 
different post-war positions reacted to it.28 This not only created opportunities for me to broaden my 
networks and conduct interviews with individuals I met at these events who fit my research design, 
but also informed my questions and understanding of peoSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQV on conflict. For example, 
the use of the term Patriotic War of Abkhazia to refer to the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-1993 in 
speeches was repeated in the interviews by those who fought or lost dear ones in the war. Attendant 
remarks and expressions signaled disillusionment of others, such as mothers of disappeared fighters 
or fighters who had not been awarded a medal, and formed the basis for follow up in the interviews. 
6HFRQG,SDUWLFLSDWHGLQPXOWLSOHLQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKLQUHVSRQGHQWV¶RUganizational contexts. 
In particular, my primary and secondary research was frequently located in the offices of veteranV¶
associations, PRWKHUV¶ organizations, and war-related libraries and museums. When conducting my 
research in these organizational settings, I was often invited to observe and participate in formal and 
informal discussions about the war and the post-war challenges that these organizations addressed. 
                                                 
28
 I knew some attendants through my daily interactions and interviews, while others, such as high-
level officials and war commanders, I learned about and approached during or after these events. 
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My main goal in these interactions was to trace the persistence of social networks from the time of 
the war into the post-war environment and identify for further interviews individuals related to one 
another through war-time bonds and those whose ties with war relations were severed. This helped 
me update my theoretical expectations on the transformation of social networks in war and tap into 
the questions of which social networks were salient for individuals with distinct war-time pasts. For 
instance, individuals who experienced injury or loss in the war later created or joined new networks 
to reflect their war-time experience, which pointed me to the relationships forged before the war, as 
opposed to present-day friendships, in trying to reconstruct the social patterns of war mobilization.  
Finally, I engaged in informal conversations on a daily basis and was occasionally invited to 
social events, including dinners, holiday celebrations, and weddings. In addition to broadening my 
networks, two features of these informal interactions proved to be central to my research. First, the 
table traditions involved pointed to the significance of the war for regular Abkhaz men and women. 
For example, every event began with a toast to those lost in the war, reflecting the effort to preserve 
war memory within social institutions and contextualizing my reVSRQGHQWV¶HIIRUWVLQWKHLQWHUYLHZ
to reconstruct their war paths in great detail. Second, jokes about certain LQGLYLGXDOV¶ self-glorifying 
tendencies as contrasted with stories of their war participation and rumors surrounding individuals 
who, for example, did not participate in the war, helped me probe accounts presented by these and 
other individuals in the interviews, strengthening the overall interview process and its outcomes.  
APPENDIX C. DATA ANALYSIS 
 As the discussion of field methods suggests, my research was characterized by the constant 
exchange between data and analysis, with analytic memos consistently recorded in my field notes 
and my theoretical expectations adjusted and further probed based on the patterns arising from the 
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data.29 However, systematic analysis of the data followed the transcription of my field materials. 
This appendix describes two major aspects of my data analysis, coding and process tracing.  
Coding 
 Coding in qualitative research, what Miles and Huberman (1994, 10) cDOO³GDWDUHGXFWLRQ´ 
³UHIHUVWRWKHSURFHVVRIselecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that 
appear in written-XSILHOGQRWHVRUWUDQVFULSWLRQV´0\DQDO\WLFFKRLFHVIRUFRGLQJZHUHJXLGHGE\
the existing theoretical knowledge on mobilization in civil war as well as the patterns that emerged 
during my field research. The combination of induction and deduction in the analysis allowed me to 
distinguish the effects of the alternative explanations and focus on the process underlying Abkhaz 
mobilization at the Georgian-Abkhaz war onset (George and Bennett 2005, 19-22). 
 My coding strategy consisted of three stages. In the first stage, I applied broad background 
categories to the interview data and identified pre- to post-war occupations and mobilization roles 
adopted by my respondents. Table 1 (below) provides my sample code. The Summary of Interview  
Data in the article (see Table 1) is based on the full version of this code. The background categories 
include gender, group self-identification, age, and location of the interview. Coding each interview 
according to these categories led to two important analytical results. First, I produced the detailed 
demographic breakdown of Abkhaz fighters and non-fighters carefully selected for the interviews, 
which helped place the case of Abkhazia within the broader universe of civil war cases. Second, I 
confirmed that the interviews were balanced across the four locales that form the basis of my micro- 
comparative research design and reflected the local-level spatial and temporal differences at the war 
onset that could have differentiated mobilization processes between the locales. 
 
                                                 
29
 See Saldaña (2009, 32-4) on analytic memos. 
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Table 1. Coding Sample, Stage 1  
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Legend: 
A  Abkhaz  
EF  Escaped fighting in Abkhazia 
F Female  
M  Male  
NS Non-state 
OM Organized mobilization  
S  State  
SM Spontaneous mobilization  
SR Support role 
xxx Identifying details  
 
5HVSRQGHQWV¶ pre- to post-war occupations and mobilization roles were coded to ensure that 
a broad range of pre- and post-war affiliations were captured in the interviews and that the issues of 
potential bias discussed above, namely, endogeneity of memory to war processes and homogeneity 
of responses due to common political loyalties, were adequately addressed across my interviews. In 
terms of occupation, I coded rHVSRQGHQWV¶pre- and post-war employment as state or non-state, thus 
capturing formal affiliation. ,FRGHGUHVSRQGHQWV¶ participation in pre- and post-war conflict-related 
events according to their organized or spontaneous character to reflect organizational affiliation.30  
 
 
                                                 
30
 7KH³RUJDQL]HGPRELOL]DWLRQ´FRGHZDVDSSOLHGWRWKRVHUHVSRQGHQWVZKRZHUHPRELOL]HGE\ the 
organizations of the Abkhaz movement before the war and the Abkhaz de facto state after the war.  
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Figure 1. War-Time Mobilization Roles 
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C Combat  
D Defected  
EF Escaped fighting in Abkhazia 
FA Fled Abkhazia 
OM Organized mobilization  
SM Spontaneous mobilization  
SR Support Role 
 
While the pre- and post-war categories provided important background information for the 
analysis, central to the analysis was the variation in the war-time mobilization roles. The roles were 
coded according to the mobilization continuum, from non-fighter to fighter roles. Figure 1 (above) 
illustrates the continuum. The non-fighter side of the continuum incorporated individuals who fled 
Abkhazia, defected to the Georgian side, and escaped fighting in Abkhazia in the course of the war. 
The fighter side included individuals organized by the Abkhaz leadership prior to the war and those 
who mobilized on the Abkhaz side spontaneously, in support or combat roles.31 This detailed code 
allowed me to surpass the simple fighter-non-fighter dichotomy, which often characterizes studies 
of civil war mobilization, and move on to textual analysis of the different mobilization trajectories 
(Parkinson 2013, 422). 
The subsequent stages of my coding strategy involved textual analysis of the interviews² 
single and grouped according to the different war-time mobilization roles as well as in their totality 
and broken down by the pre-war, civil war, and post-war stages²LQRUGHUWR³Uepresent and capture 
                                                 
31
 War-time mobilization was coded for the period of the war onset, as most Abkhaz fighters were 
later incorporated into the Abkhaz army, which was formed during the war. 
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>HDFK@GDWXP¶VSULPDU\FRQWHQWDQGHVVHQFH´6DOGDxD$VGLVFXVVHGDERYHP\LQWHUYLHZ
strategy consisted of the combination of event and narrative accounts. My second and third stages 
of coding addressed these different aspects of the interview respectively. 
In the second stage, I focused on the respondent recollections of the events that unfolded at 
the moment of war onset in Abkhazia. I analyzed relevant parts of the interviews according to four 
categories. Table 2 (below) presents a sample of a coded interview excerpt. First, I coded references 
to expectations of the war, as indicated by the expressions of prior knowledge about the possibility 
of the Georgian advance and preparation for it, for example, through arming, and such descriptions 
of the advance as sudden DQGRWKHUV¶UHDFWLRQs to it as confused. Second, the source of information 
about the war was specified in the reports of the individuals or groups and the location²physical or 
media²where respondents heard about the Georgian advance. This category was as well recorded 
if respondents informed others, for instance, by telephone. Third, I coded the content of information 
that respondents received, with a particular focus on the different framing and perceptions of threat. 
Threat framing emerged from the use of alarming terms in describing received information, such as 
armed clashes, shot at, and casualties. Threat perceptions were evident in the acknowledgement of 
this information. The final aspects of coding targeted the social networks involved in mobilization. 
First, I differentiated between the collective and individual nature of action and decision-making in 
response to received information. Second, I coded the LQGLYLGXDO¶V location at the war onset and that 
at the time of mobilization, which indicated the importance of certain social networks, for example, 
WKRVHLQRQH¶VKRPHWRZQ. Finally, I recorded the instances of specific reference to social networks. 
This stage of coding prepared my interview data for the reconstruction of step by step mobilization 
sequences, essential for the process tracing method I use (see section below), following individual 
respondents and grouped across the interviews according to the different mobilization trajectories. 
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Table 2. Coding Sample, Stage 2 
 
Interview Excerpt Code  
The day of the war, in 1992, I was in Sochi, [Russia]. 
 
On my way back [to Abkhazia], I saw that cars were 
standing and people [at the border]  were passionately 
discussing something.  
 
I did not know what happened.  
 
At that time, the first armed clashes were happening in 
Ochamchira. The first casualties appeared. 
 
They [Georgia] sent their troops here [to Abkhazia] 
suddenly.  
 
We began calling everyone by phone. We called all 
the friends.  
 
Everyone was confused at the administration. No one 
could understand the situation. 
  
We gathered [with my sports team] at the sports 
ground [in Gagra where I am from]: what do we do?  
 
[I was told that m]y brothers were coming [to Gagra] 
from Gudauta and were shot at in Kolkhida. 
They died.  
 
Now we understood who it was that we faced. The 
armaments, heavy weapons, small arms: they had it all 
and we had nothing. The Abkhaz population of Gagra 
was armed with double-barreled guns and had no 
[army] structure when the war began. Our strengths 
were uneven.  
 
We formed around our close ones.  
Location at the war onset 
 
 
Source of information about the war  
 
 
Expectation of the war 
 
Threat framing 
 
 
 
Expectation of the war 
 
Source of information about the war  
Social networks  
 
Expectation of the war 
 
 
Collective action; Social networks; Lo-
cation at mobilization; Coll. decision 
 
Threat framing 
 
 
Threat perception 
 
 
Expectation of the war 
 
 
 
Social networks  
 
The final stage of coding focused on recurring themes in the narrative part of the interviews. My 
proximity and continuous engagement with the interviews, along with the insight on the case I 
developed in the course of my primary and secondary research, helped me identify and code salient  
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Table 3. Coding Sample, Stage 3 
 
Interview Excerpt Code  
Abkhazia had statehood for 2000 years. It was only 
during Stalin that we were reduced to an autonomy. 
But Georgians thought that Abkhazia did not exist.  
 
To sweep Abkhazia with Georgians, GHRUJLD«OHGWKH 
process of Georgianization of the Abkhaz nation.  
 
There were localized clashes and more everyday ones. 
It was scary when big crowds gathered on both sides. 
[Soviet]  leaders did not allow significant bloodshed to 
happen. But it still happened.  
 
Fights always began with: ³:K\WKH$bkhaz do not 
know the Georgian language«´ 
 
We did not attack them. They did. We do not have 
another motherland as opposed to Georgians who are 
both here and there. They have their motherland, 
Georgia. 
Georgianization (political status) 
 
 
 
Georgianization (demography) 
 
 
Pre-war violence  
 
Violence containment  
 
 
Georgianization (culture) 
 
 
Attack  
Motivation (belonging to Abkhazia)  
 
themes. Table 3 (above) offers a sample code. The so-called Georgianization of Abkhazia emerged 
in references to the UHGXFWLRQLQ$ENKD]LD¶VSROLWLFDOVWDWXV Georgian demographic expansion, and 
cultural repression through language policy, among others. Mention of pre-war violence and Soviet 
violence containment added to the structural context inferred from these themes. The description of 
the Georgian advance as an offensive and attack and motivations listed for participation in the war, 
including belonging to Abkhazia and the Abkhaz as a group and fear for personal security or that of 
close family and friends, related to this context. This stage of coding helped me distinguish between 
the understandings of conflict and motivations of individuals in the varied mobilization trajectories. 
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Process Tracing 
 I applied the method of process tracing to the coded data because my core theoretical aim in 
this research was to discover the process underlying civil war mobilization in the understudied case 
that is poorly predicted by the existing approaches to mobilization.32 As George and Bennett (2005, 
215DUJXH³>S@URFHVVWUDFLQJLVSDUWLFXODUO\XVHIXOIRr obtaining an explanation IRU« cases« that 
KDYHRXWFRPHVQRWSUHGLFWHGRUH[SODLQHGDGHTXDWHO\E\H[LVWLQJWKHRULHV´33 The focus in process 
tracing on causal mechanisms lies at the core of such discovery.34 ³In process-tracing,´ Beach and 
Pedersen (2013, 49) H[SODLQ³we theorize more than just X and Y; we also theorize the mechanism 
EHWZHHQWKHP´7KHWKUHDWIUDPLQJPHFKDQLVPWKDWUHVXOWHGIURPWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQLQGXFWLYH
and deductive analysis in this research is discussed in detail in the theoretical section of the article. 
Figure 2 (below) presents the mechanism in the outline form to specify the steps I took to assess it, 
as compared to the alternative explanations. 
To assess the mechanism, the method directs us to ³VHTXHQWLDOSURFHVVHVZLWKLQDSarticular 
KLVWRULFDOFDVH´*HRUJHDQG%HQQHWW 13). The following sequence should be observed if the 
threat framing mechanism holds. In general, individuals should mobilize at the war onset following 
threat framing. In particular, three steps should be observed. First, actors across social structures 
should address individuals in private and public in an attempt to frame the Georgian advance as an 
aggression against the collectivity. Second, respondents should reference this framing in how they 
learned about and perceived the advance. Third, respondents who reported to have perceived threat  
                                                 
32
 See Beissinger (2002, 222) on the application of the existing approaches to Abkhaz mobilization. 
33
 See Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Bennett and Checkel (2014) for a discussion of the method.  
34
 The definition of causal mechanisms is contested (Checkel 2008). However, causal mechanisms 
can be understood as ³XOWLPDWHO\XQREVHUYDEOHSK\VLFDOVRFLDORUSV\FKRORJLFDOSURFHVVHVWKURXJK
which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts of conditions, to transfer 
energy, information, or matter to otheUHQWLWLHV´*HRUJHDQG%HQQHWW 
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Figure 2. Threat Framing Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as directed primarily to themselves should hide, flee, or defect to the stronger, Georgian side. Those 
who prioritized threat against Abkhazia and cited the shared understanding of the conflict as part of 
the so-called Georgianization of Abkhazia should mobilize to fight on the weaker, Abkhaz side. 
I verified this sequence by reconstructing individual mobilization trajectories to the lowest 
level of detail and grouping these trajectories across the interviews to produce the general organized 
and spontaneous fighter and non-fighter trajectories of mobilization.35 The resulting rich account of 
Abkhaz mobilization at the Georgian-Abkhaz war onset improves on the alternatives in the relative 
deprivation (Gurr 1970), collective action (Weinstein 2007), and strategic interaction (Kalyvas and 
Kocher 2007) approaches to mobilization. Table 4 (below) charts the observable implications and 
application of these theoretical approaches to the case of Abkhaz mobilization at the war onset. 
Relative deprivation concerns the conditions of relative inequality before war and attributes 
mobilization to ethnic, economic, political, and cultural grievances (Gurr 1970). Individuals should 
mobilize on the side that is marginalized due to its ethnic belonging and is excluded from economic 
opportunities, political process, and cultural development. While ethnic marginalization does not 
                                                 
35
 The most representative interview excerpts within each trajectory were selected for presentation. 
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Table 4. Alternative Explanations 
 
Theory 
 
Relative Deprivation  
 
Collective Action Strategic Interaction 
 
OIs 
Ethnically 
marginalized 
Economically 
deprived 
Politically/ 
culturally 
excluded 
Materially 
incentivized 
Coerced Socially 
sanctioned 
Security 
seeking 
CA        
Legend: 
OIs Observable implications 
CA Case application  
 Does not hold 
 Partly holds  
 Strongly holds  
 
hold strongly, economic, political, and cultural access are important in the Abkhaz case. Exclusion 
based on ethnicity²nationality in the Soviet terminology²was a serious breach of the Communist 
ideology, punishable by dismissal from leadership positions, and checked through the titular status 
that guaranteed representation in the Soviet republics to native groups, such as the Abkhaz. As the 
Union disintegrated before the war, the Abkhaz were overrepresented in Abkhaz institutions, with 
a quota of seats in the Supreme Council achieved through the power-sharing arrangement with the 
post-Soviet Georgian leadership that surpassed that of Georgians (45% of the population in 1989).  
 However, economic, political, and cultural grievances played a role in Abkhaz mobilization. 
Economic deprivation partially holds in the Abkhaz case as Georgia controlled most oI$ENKD]LD¶V
economy, with leading economic positions in enterprises and the state held largely by Georgians. 
This pattern can be explained by the proportion of the Abkhaz (17% in 1989) in the population and 
did not affect access to regular employment, where the Soviet standards based on inclusion applied, 
giving the Abkhaz access available to other demographic groups and special titular quotas favoring 
the Abkhaz in education and employment opportunities, especially in the last decade of the Union. 
While economic access was part of Abkhaz pre-war concerns, it is political and cultural grievances 
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that formed the basis of Abkhaz claims. These grievances were related to the change in the political 
status of Abkhazia, from the Soviet Socialist Republic established in 1921 to the autonomous part 
of Georgia in 1931, and the so-called Georgianization of Abkhazia, or the corresponding Georgian 
demographic growth and suppression of Abkhaz language, schools, and other cultural institutions. 
Most Abkhaz shared in these grievances, but relative deprivation does not tell us how they mattered 
in producing the variation in organized, spontaneous, and non-fighter trajectories at the war onset.  
 Similarly, the collective action approach offers important insight into Abkhaz mobilization. 
According to this approach, mobilization poses a free-riding problem, which can be overcome with 
selective incentives and social sanctions (Weinstein 2007). Individuals should mobilize on the side 
that offers material and social rewards or punishment. While the Abkhaz side was unable to coerce 
mobilization or provide material incentives at the war onset, it is a typical strong community able to 
reward participants in status and punish non-participants through future exclusion from community 
benefits. The small size of the Abkhaz population (93.267 in 1989) and the history of demographic, 
political, and cultural changes in Abkhazia added to the strength of familia (family name) ties and 
Apsuara (duty) norms. Passed through generations in households and other social institutions, these 
strong community pressures applied to most Abkhaz, yet not all mobilized to fight at the war onset. 
 Finally, according to the strategic interaction theoretical approach, the Abkhaz should have 
been observed to mobilize on the stronger, Georgian side at the war onset or defect to the Georgian 
side early in the war, as Georgia established control over most of Abkhazia. This would provide the 
Abkhaz with the increased chances of survival in the war²a goal that security-seeking individuals 
should follow (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). However, mobilization on the Georgian side among the 
Abkhaz was rare. Moreover, the Abkhaz mobilized both armed and unarmed and in the areas where 
Georgia controlled the territory. Despite the casualties on the Abkhaz side and the exit options that 
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existed, especially at the war onset, Abkhaz mobilization continued, to attain control over strategic 
western Abkhazia and form the Abkhaz army in the course of the war. Whereas this army structure 
provided access to skills and resources for fighters joining the Abkhaz force later in the war, which 
should promote participation in line with the security-seeking explanation, it did not exist at the war 
onset and does not explain this immediate mass mobilization against the superior Georgian force.  
As a result, alternative explanations address significant factors, but do not fully account for 
Abkhaz mobilization. Relative deprivation and collective action shed light on the socio-structural 
context of mobilization, yet cannot explain why some Abkhaz mobilized and others did not despite 
the common presence of grievances and social sanctions for mobilization. The strategic interaction 
approach struggles to account for the outcome of mobilization in the case, as the Abkhaz were the 
weaker side in the war and joining it did not increase but jeopardized individual security. The threat 
framing mechanism I propose draws on these approaches and provides a theoretical alternative. It 
survives the comparison across space and time in Abkhazia, as required in my micro-comparative 
research design, and informs the variation in the observed fighter and non-fighter trajectories.  
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APPENDED MATERIALS 
Table 5. List of Secondary Research Sites 
 
News Archives 
Abkhazia  
1. Apsnypress (1994-2011) 
2. Echo Abhazii (1995-2011)  
3. Respublika Abhazija (1999-2011) 
Georgia 
1. Georgian Chronicles (1992-1997) 
2. Svobodnaja Gruzija (1992-2006) 
3. The Armed Forces in Georgia (1998-1999) 
4. The Army and Society in Georgia (1999-2001) 
Russia  
1. Current Digest of Russian Press (1992-2011) 
International 
1. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (1992-2011) 
Other Archives 
1. State Statistics Administration Abkhazia in Numbers (2002-2010) 
2. State Republican Library of Abkhazia War Archive (1992-1993) 
3. Ekaterina Bebia Private Video Archive (1992-2008) 
4. Gagra TV Video Archive (1992-2008) 
5. Gudauta War Museum War Archive (1992-1993) 
6. Published Interview Archives (Khodzhaa, 2003, 2006, 2009) 
7. Published War Document Archive (Volkhonskij et al., 2008) 
8. Private Archive of Aidgylara (1989-1992) 
Libraries 
*DJUD/LEUDU\ʋ*DJUD$ENKD]LD 
2. Gudauta War Museum Library, Gudauta, Abkhazia 
3. State Republican Library, Sukhum/i. Abkhazia 
4. National Parliamentary Library of Georgia, Tbilisi, Georgia 
5. Russian State Library, Moscow, Russia 
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Table 6. Summary of Secondary Interviews 
 
   Total36  Percentage 
(rounded) 
G
en
er
al
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n  
Gender  
 
Male  23 62% 
Female  14 38% 
 
Location 
 
Georgia  31 84% 
Russia  6 16% 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 
ty
pe
 
 
Expert37  
 
 
24 
 
65% 
 
Focus group38 
 
 
7 
 
19% 
 
War witness39 
 
 
6 
 
16% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Calculated based on 37 respondents in 30 interviews and one focus group. 
37
 This category includes university professors, governmental officials, and representatives of non-
governmental organizations and research institutes. 
38
 The focus group was carried out with support of the Ministry of Education of Abkhazia in exile 
with respondents who witnessed the war in Abkhazia and were displaced to Georgia. 
39
 This category includes respondents who witnessed the war in Abkhazia and were displaced. 
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